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I. INTRODUCTION 
Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our 
Nation’s national security and economic well-being.1
The United States is facing an international challenge: 
economic espionage, the theft of our intellectual assets and 
proprietary information.2 The events of September 11, 2001 
pushed the seriousness of this activity to the far recesses of the 
public’s consciousness. While this threat to our national security 
lacks the visceral impact of September 11th, the long term 
national security implications (a decline in economic 
competitiveness) stemming from the systemic theft of 
intellectual property has consequences no less serious than a 
1. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034 
(statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing H.R. 3723). 
2. This Article adopts the definition of “economic espionage” included in the 
Economic Espionage Act of 1996, i.e., economic espionage consists of misappropriating 
trade secrets belonging to citizens of one country in order to benefit another country. See 
infra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the §1831 offense). The definition used in this Article is 
in one sense more generic than that incorporated in the Economic Espionage Act. The 
Act differentiates between the theft of trade secrets, which is carried out without the 
intent to benefit a foreign sovereign, and economic espionage. See infra subpart III.A.2. 
Those who steal trade secrets are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, while those who 
engage in economic espionage are prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1831. See infra subpart 
III.A.2. For various reasons, foreign nationals who steal trade secrets belonging to U.S. 
citizens, presumably for the benefit of their own countries, are often prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 1832. See discussion infra subpart III.B.1. The definition of economic espionage 
used in this Article is not predicated on the offense charged. It looks to the nature of the 
conduct at issue and would, therefore, encompass instances in which those prosecuted 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1832 actually engaged in economic espionage, i.e., actually acted to 
benefit a foreign sovereign. The broader definition is necessary to implement the 
Article’s focus on economic espionage as a unique type of criminal activity. 
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real-world terrorist attack. Espionage targeting intellectual 
assets and proprietary information is driven by the 
international competition characterizing a global economy.3 
Americans have long ignored the preeminent rule of 
international economic competition: “Expediency outgrosses 
morality.”4 The success or failure of our ability to compete will 
determine U.S. economic well-being and, ultimately, our 
national security. The global economy that emerged after the 
Cold War is replete with strong, independent, predatory 
competitors, a state of affairs that can be attributed largely to 
U.S. economic globalism and the showcasing of American 
technology.5 The desire for American technology is the primary 
motivation for the continuing economic espionage activities 
undertaken by a multitude of foreign countries. 
It has been obvious for over a decade that economic 
espionage is a serious problem.6 Appreciating the seriousness of 
this threat, Congress passed the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996; the President signed the Act into law on October 11, 1996.7 
The Economic Espionage Act (EEA) took a traditional approach 
to the activity at issue by treating the misappropriation of 
proprietary economic information as theft and criminalizing it.8 
Congress believed that by prosecuting and sanctioning those 
who unlawfully appropriate proprietary information, we can 
deter others from engaging in such conduct.9
3. J. Thompson Strong, Tilting with Machiavelli: Fighting Competitive Espionage 
in the 1990s, 7 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE (NO. 2) 161, 162 
(1994). 
4. Id. at 161–62. 
5. William T. Warner, International Technology Transfer and Economic Espionage, 
7 INT’L J. OF INTELLIGENCE & COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 143, 143–44 (1994). 
6. See, e.g., United States v. Hsu, 155 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1998) (“The end of the 
Cold War sent government spies scurrying to the private sector to perform illicit work for 
businesses and corporations . . . and by 1996 . . . nearly $24 billion of corporate 
intellectual property was being stolen each year.”). 
7. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d at 194–95. 
8. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 11, 110 Stat. 
3488, § 1831 (1996). 
9. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 104-359, at 11 (1996). As stated in the report, “Only by 
adopting a national scheme to protect U.S. proprietary economic information can we 
hope to maintain our industrial and economic edge and thus safeguard our national 
security. Foremost, we believe that the greatest benefit of the Federal statute will be as a 
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Prosecution and punishment can contribute to preventing 
economic espionage, but they, alone, cannot accomplish this, for 
reasons we explain below. Our purpose in writing this Article is 
to point out the danger of relying on traditional solutions in a 
nontraditional era; reacting to completed acts of economic 
espionage by sanctioning the perpetrator(s) is an effective 
strategy only if they can be identified, located, and apprehended. 
Part II explains what economic espionage is and why it is a 
serious problem. Part III reviews the provisions and 
enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act and explains why it 
is not a viable approach to economic espionage in the twenty-
first century. Part IV considers how we can more effectively 
address economic espionage. 
II. THE PROBLEM 
This Part outlines the problems we face from economic 
espionage. As subpart II.A notes, trade secrets, which are at the 
heart of economic espionage, extend beyond classified military 
information and technologies into a world in which information 
has become our most important asset. subpart II.B describes 
how cyberspace has altered the traditional dynamic involved in 
economic espionage; the Internet has erased significant 
financing, proximity, scale, and physical constraints while at the 
same time protecting an attacker’s identity and reducing risk. 
subpart II.C explains that economic espionage has become a 
worldwide threat, with a long list of “usual suspects.” Subpart 
II.D notes that economic espionage can yield significant business 
and competitive advantages and explains that an understanding 
of these advantages is necessary to understand the legal and 
illegal practices of information gathering. Finally, subpart II.E 
reviews the overall scope of the problem, while subpart II.F. 
focuses on hacker tools and the logistical methods of present day 
economic espionage. 
powerful deterrent.” Id. 
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A. State-Sponsored Economic Espionage 
[S]ome foreign countries, including the major 
players, . . . continued to employ state actors—including 
their intelligence services—as well as commercial 
enterprises, particularly when seeking the most 
sensitive and difficult to acquire technologies.10
The critical element of the EEA, which is analyzed in Part 
III, infra, is the involvement of foreign governments, their 
agents, or instrumentalities deriving benefits from the 
acquisition of a nation’s trade secrets. U.S. expenditures on 
research and development initiatives are in excess of two 
hundred billion dollars annually and are the largest by far of 
any developed country. This fact, together with the reality that 
economic competition is an immutable aspect of international 
relations, makes the United States a target rich environment for 
economic espionage activity. The critical issue this Article 
highlights is the fact that espionage is much broader than 
efforts by traditional adversaries to avail themselves of strictly 
classified military information. The current threat is posed by 
traditional and nontraditional adversaries. This threat is 
directed at the spectrum of proprietary and military 
technologies that have traditionally provided the United States 
with a qualitative economic and military advantage. These 
advantages translate directly to the economic and military 
strength that has enabled the United States to attain its current 
status as the world’s only true super-power. 
The EEA resulted from Congress’ recognizing that foreign 
elements were engaging in active and on-going economic 
espionage operations.11 These activities are designed to exploit 
10. OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL REPORT TO 
CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL ESPIONAGE—2004 ix–x 
(2004), http://www.nacic.gov/publications/reports_speeches/reports/fecie_all/fecie_2004/ 
FecieAnnual report_2004_NoCoverPages.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX 2004 REPORT]. 
11. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12207-08 (1996). Senator Specter stated: 
In an increasingly complex and competitive economic world, intellectual 
property forms a critical component of our economy. As traditional industries 
shift to low-wage producers in developing countries, our economic edge 
depends to an ever-increasing degree on the ability of our businesses and 
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the benefits of U.S. research and development without 
expending the financial capital necessary to develop indigenous 
technologies or trade secrets. In today’s world, a nation’s 
economic viability is the true measure of its power.12 Military 
strength is contingent upon an economy’s ability to integrate 
technological advancements having dual use (commercial and 
military) applications. 
inventors to stay one step ahead of those in other countries. And American 
business and inventors have been extremely successful and creative in 
developing intellectual property and trade secrets. America leads the 
nation’s [sic] of the world in developing new products and new technologies. 
Millions of jobs depend on the continuation of the productive minds of 
Americans, both native born and immigrants who find the freedom here to 
try new ideas and add to our economic strength. Inventing new and better 
technologies, production methods, and the like, can be expensive. American 
companies and the U.S. Government spend billions on research and 
development. The benefits reaped from these expenditures can easily come to 
nothing, however, if a competitor can simply steal the trade secret without 
expending the development costs. While prices may be reduced, ultimately 
the incentives for new invention disappear, along with jobs, capital 
investment, and everything else that keeps our economy strong. For years 
now, there has been mounting evidence that many foreign nations and their 
corporations have been seeking to gain competitive advantage by stealing 
the trade secrets, the intangible intellectual property of inventors in this 
country. The Intelligence Committee has been aware that since the end of 
the cold war [sic], foreign nations have increasingly put their espionage 
resources to work trying to steal American economic secrets. Estimates of 
the loss to U.S. business from the theft of intangible intellectual property 
exceed $100 billion. The loss in U.S. jobs is incalculable. 
Id. 
12. Thierry Oliver Desmet, The Economic Espionage Act of 1996: Are We Finally 
Taking Corporate Spies Seriously?, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 93, 96–97 (1999). 
Since the end of the Cold War, the focus of intelligence and 
counterintelligence efforts has shifted from military and political targets to 
technological and economic ones. Nations have been reshaping their 
intelligence agencies and investigative resources to be more responsive to the 
competitive and global needs of businesses. The Cold War has been replaced 
by the Economic War. The increase in trade secret theft has placed the 
technologies of U.S. companies, ranging from simple textile formulas to 
complex defense technology, at great risk. 
Id. (notes omitted). 
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B. Economic Espionage and the Internet13 
Increasingly, foreign entities need not even come to the 
United States to acquire sensitive technology but, 
instead, can work within their own borders. There, U.S. 
firms have difficulty securing their secrets and have few 
legal protections once proprietary information has been 
lost.14
Economic espionage is far from a new phenomenon. The 
development of the U.S. textile industry in the early 1800s is a 
direct result of Francis Cabot Lowell visiting England and 
memorizing the workings of their power looms. Upon returning 
to New England he recruited a master mechanic to recreate and 
develop what he had memorized.15 The Chinese were able to 
protect their proprietary interests in the silk trade for in excess 
of two thousand years, further illustrating that economic 
espionage is not a recent phenomena.16 The secret was 
ultimately lost, according to one account, when a Chinese 
princess married a foreign prince and smuggled silkworm eggs 
out of China by hiding them in her voluminous hair piece (circa 
AD 440).17 A second account credits two Nestorian monks (circa 
AD 550) with smuggling silkworm eggs in their hollow bamboo 
staves for delivery to the Byzantine Emperor Justinian.18 The 
point of these historical anecdotes is to demonstrate that human 
behavioral characteristics have not changed over the ages. This 
behavior continues to provide the incentive for reducing an 
adversary’s competitive advantage by utilizing espionage 
techniques to elicit proprietary secrets. 
The challenge of protecting intellectual and proprietary 
assets has been made more difficult by the arrival of the 
information age and the Internet. Information has become a 
marketable commodity with an inherent value and intrinsic self-
13. For more on this issue, see infra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime 
and online crime). 
14. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 1. 
15. See John J. Fialka, While America Sleeps, 21 WILSON Q. 48, 51 (1997). 
16. See, e.g., History of Silk, http://silkroadfoundation.org/artl/silkhistory.shtml. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
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worth. The fact that technological progress has evolved to the 
point where information is stored on networks, many of which 
are linked together by the Internet, has changed the framework 
relating to information protection and the legal boundaries that 
traditionally served to constrain the dissemination of sensitive 
data to nonauthorized users. 
Prior to the era of digital connectivity, intellectual property 
and trade secrets were targeted by foreign intelligence services, 
competitors and criminals, using collection methods consisting 
of classic agent recruitments, volunteers, surveillance, 
surreptitious entry, and specialized technical operations.19 All of 
these techniques were characterized by boundaries imposed by 
conventional three-dimensional limits relating to proximity, 
scale, physical constraints, and patterns.20 The Internet and its 
employment of a new medium, cyberspace, dramatically 
changed the nature of information collection whether the 
collector is a foreign intelligence service, competitor or 
criminal.21 Cyberspace does not restrict a collector to traditional 
techniques. It expands collection methods and operations by 
leveraging existing tradecraft with a dramatic reduction in risk 
and a corresponding logarithmic increase in potential reward.22
Collectors employing Internet collection techniques are not 
bound by the need to have proximate access to targeted 
information or agents. The process of spotting, assessing, 
recruiting, evaluating, and deploying potential agents no longer 
requires that a case officer make direct contact to accomplish 
tasks relating to logistics, communications, and security. These 
19. See ONCIX REPORT 2004, supra note10. at 3. 
20. Susan W. Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace: A New Model of 
Law Enforcement?, 30 RUTGERS COMP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 1–9 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner, 
A New Model of Law Enforcement]. 
21. Id. 
22. One source notes, for example, that “[m]any spy agencies around the world are 
adapting classic spy techniques from military and political espionage endeavors to 
conduct economic espionage.” Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions 
Redefined, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 303 (1997). According to this author, these “[a]gencies 
use a number of ‘intrusive’ methods to obtain classified proprietary economic information 
relating to trade secrets,” which include “[e]avesdropping through wiretapping, bugging 
offices, or capturing cellular telephone conversations” and “[p]enetrating a computer 
system through hacking into the network, hard drive, or software.” Id. 
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intelligence agents to detect, deter, and disrupt an adversary’s 
operations. Their absence necessitates a major shift in 
counterintelligence operations to counter the absence of 
traditional indicators of collection activity. 
Prior to the employment of digital memory devices and 
network connectivity, intelligence operatives were limited with 
respect to the scale of their operations and individual case 
officer and agent supervisory spans of control. “Cyber case 
officers” using virtual agents do not have the scale of their 
operations limited to a finite number of “cyber agents” but, 
instead, can deploy virtual cyber resources in unlimited 
quantities simultaneously. These cyber agents can respond to 
multiple collection requirements, remotely targeting multiple 
objectives simultaneously with limited risk. The reduction in 
risk is due to the absence of physical constraints present in 
traditional intelligence operations.  
Perhaps the greatest advantage to the collector is the ability 
to utilize the absence of proximity, scale, and lack of physical 
constraints together with deception schemes intended to conceal 
the identity and location of the actual adversary. The novelty of 
digital intelligence-gathering and concomitant absence of 
patterns is a primary factor in the reduction of risk, making 
these methods so attractive. A victimized government, 
corporation, or individual today will have an exceptionally 
challenging task merely identifying the cyber collector who has 
targeted their information. This is, of course, assuming the 
victim is even aware of the fact that he or she has been subject 
to an attack!  
Additional factors driving intelligence operatives to fully 
engage in virtual collection methods and operations is the well-
documented reluctance of victims to report digital penetration 
and the fact that several studies reflect exceptionally low 
awareness of victims recognizing that they have been subjected 
to attacks. 
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C. Economic Espionage: The Usual Suspects? 
[T]he Federal Bureau of Investigation . . . has reported that 
at least twenty-three foreign governments actively target the 
intellectual property of U.S. corporations. One FBI study also 
found that of 173 countries, 100 were spending resources to 
acquire U.S. technology.23
Reports published by the Central Intelligence Agency and 
Government Accounting Office have publicly identified foreign 
countries engaging in state-sponsored collection activities 
targeting intellectual property and trade secrets belonging to 
the United States.24 Recognizing the severity of foreign collection 
operations targeting U.S. technology, Congress has required an 
annual report which will keep it informed of the threat 
parameters.25 This report, which is entitled “Annual Report to 
Congress on Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial 
Espionage,” is published annually in a classified and 
unclassified version.26 The 2003 unclassified version notes that 
“[f]oreign businessmen, scientists, academics, and government 
officials from more than 90 countries continued targeting 
sensitive U.S. technologies and corporate trade secrets in both 
2002 and 2003, according to a variety of reporting available to 
23. Chris Carr & Larry Gorman, The Revictimization of Companies by the Stock 
Market Who Report Trade Secret Theft Under the Economic Espionage Act, 57 BUS. LAW 
25, 27 (2001–2002). 
The following countries are allegedly extensively engaged in espionage 
activities against American companies: France, Israel, Russia, China, Iran, 
Cuba, the Netherlands, Belgium, Germany, Japan, Canada, India, and 
several Scandinavian countries. The most frequently targeted industries 
appear to include aerospace, biotechnology, computer software and 
hardware, transportation and engine technology, defense technology, 
telecommunications, energy research, advanced materials and codings, 
‘stealth’ technologies, lasers, manufacturing processes, and semi-conductors. 
Id. 
24. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE NAT’L COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EXECUTIVE, ANNUAL 
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC COLLECTION AND INDUSTRIAL 
ESPIONAGE—2003 iii (2004), http://www.nacic.gov/publications/reports_speeches/ reports/ 
fecie_all/fecie_2003/fecie_2003.pdf [hereinafter ONCIX 2003 REPORT]. 
25. See id. 
26. Id. 
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the U.S. Counterintelligence (CI) Community.”27 A primary 
distinction between the two versions of the report relates to the 
identification of specific foreign countries engaging in various 
collection activities. However, despite the omission of specific 
country identities in the open version of the Annual Report, 
cursory research of open sources permits an analyst to make 
judgments likely reflecting those nations most actively engaged 
in these operations. 
A 1996 article in the Washington Post referred to a CIA 
public report identifying the governments of France, Israel, 
China, Russia, Iran, and Cuba as being extensively involved in 
economic espionage. According to the article, “[a]s for Japan, 
which is often accused of high-tech thievery, the CIA said that 
nation’s efforts to collect economic data ‘are mostly legal and 
involve seeking openly available material or hiring well-placed 
consultants.’”28 The information reported in the article was 
released by the CIA as part of a declassified hearing volume on 
“Current and Projected National Security Threats to the United 
States.”29
In addition to the countries acknowledged in the CIA report, 
recently published news accounts and other documents have 
included South Korea and Germany as active participants in 
efforts aimed at collecting U.S. sensitive information.30 It should 
be stated that historically the U.S. government has been 
reluctant to publicly identify foreign governments considered to 
be its traditional allies as engaging in economic espionage. This 
reluctance reflects the diplomatic reality that relations between 
governments occur on many levels simultaneously. Therefore, 
publicly acknowledging that an ally is aggressively attempting 
to collect sensitive government information may serve to 
needlessly escalate diplomatic tensions. Normally, these 
concerns are addressed via back channels with private warnings 
27. Id. at v. 
28. Paul Blustein, France, Israel Alleged to Spy on U.S. Firms, WASH. POST, 
Aug. 16, 1996, at A28. 
29. S. Rep. No. 105-1, at 12 (1997). 
30. See, e.g., INTERAGENCY OPSEC SUPPORT STAFF, OPERATIONS SECURITY: 
INTELLIGENCE THREAT HANDBOOK § 5 (1996), http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/ioss/threat96/ 
part05.htm [hereinafter OPERATIONS SECURITY].
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and subtle signals indicating that continued behavior deemed 
unacceptable may rise to a level outside of normal diplomatic 
channels, and if the behavior continues, it may be accompanied 
by embarrassing political consequences. Additionally, it is 
generally acknowledged that all countries engage in various 
aspects of espionage to one degree or another. The inclination to 
promulgate a “holier than thou” attitude with respect to 
espionage has the potential to be perceived as highly 
hypocritical in the event of a retaliatory response. 
The advent of the information age and corresponding global 
connectivity has increased the vulnerabilities of U.S. intellectual 
assets. The 2003 Annual Report to Congress reports that 
multiple sources of evidence suggest that foreign interests are 
increasingly looking to cyber tools as a means of enhancing their 
ability to illegally acquire sensitive information.31 Digital 
incursions are difficult to detect, and there is a lack of factual 
data conclusively establishing the dollar value of assets lost 
annually by these methods. However, estimates by the 
American Society of Industrial Security, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, and PricewaterhouseCoopers, derived from a 2002 
survey of Fortune 1000 corporations and 600 small to mid-sized 
U.S. companies, state that proprietary information and 
intellectual property losses accounted for between fifty-three 
and fifty-nine billion dollars.32 There is a consensus that the 
31. See ONCIX 2003 REPORT, supra note 24, at v. The 2004 Annual Report to 
Congress specifically notes that: 
[g]lobal connectivity via the Internet adds to U.S. vulnerability. A variety of 
evidence suggests that foreign interests continue looking to cyber tools as a 
means to illegally acquire trade secrets. The number of information security 
incidents reported to the U.S. Computer Security Readiness Team is an 
indicator of the rapid rate at which cyber activity has grown in recent years. 
The number of such incidents rose from about 500,000 events in 2002 to 1.4 
million in 2003 and then to 56 million events in the first six months of 2004, 
according to press reports. 
Detection of such intrusions is difficult but, even when detected, a recent 
private U.S. survey indicated that more than half of the impacted firms do 
not report the breach for fear of reducing shareholder value. As a result, no 
one is certain how much technology and sensitive proprietary information 
are lost annually to cyber theft. 
See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 2.
32. ASIS Int’l, U.S. Companies Lost up to $59 Billion in Proprietary Information 
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Internet has provided traditional and nontraditional adversaries 
with a low-risk, inexpensive collection mechanism capable of 
targeting and circumventing security countermeasures.33 
Anecdotal country information obtained exclusively from open 
sources is presented to illustrate the international variety of 
threats and cyber tactics employed by various foreign 
governments. 
1. France34 
The French view of economic competition is characterized by 
the belief that a state of continuous competition exists among 
nations where market advantages are pursued by all available 
means.35 This helps to explain the lengthy history of French 
government intelligence agencies targeting U.S. economic and 
proprietary data. The French General Directorate of External 
Security (DGSE) has been reported as targeting economic 
intelligence since at least 1964.36 Corporations reported to be 
targeted by the DGSE in the past have included Loral Space 
Systems and Hughes Aircraft, the former Lockheed Missile and 
Space Company, TRW, and GTE.37 Information targeted 
included satellite and telecommunications data.38
Former director of French Intelligence Pierre Marion is 
frequently quoted as stating, “getting intelligence in economic, 
technological, and industrial matters [from] a country [with] 
which you are allied . . . is not incompatible with the fact of 
being allied.”39 A unique aspect of French economic espionage 
collection efforts, detailed by Peter Scwweizer in his book 
and Intellectual Property, http://www.asisonline.org/newsroom/pressReleases1093002 
trends.xml (last visited Jan. 27, 2006). 
33. ONCIX 2003 REPORT, supra note 24, at 1. 
34. For more on France’s economic espionage activities, see, e.g., JOHN J. FIALKA, 
WAR BY OTHER MEANS: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE IN AMERICA 87–100 (1997). 
35. See, e.g., JOHN A. NOLAN III, A CASE STUDY IN FRENCH ESPIONAGE: 
RENAISSANCE SOFTWARE, U.S. OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE 1 (2000), 
http://www.hanford.gov/oci/maindocs/ci_r_docs/frenchesp.pdf.
36. See, e.g., OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5.
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. PETER SCHWEITZER, FRIENDLY SPIES: HOW AMERICA’S ALLIES ARE USING 
ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE TO STEAL OUR SECRETS 99 (1993) (alteration in original). 
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Friendly Spies, involves the use of “honorary correspondents” or 
part-time agents.40 This network of part timers is comprised of 
corporate officials living overseas, French bankers in New York 
City and bureaucrats at the European Community in Brussels.41 
Employees of nationalized French companies are particularly 
prone to act as part time collectors.42  
In 1996, the French established the Ecole de Guerre 
Econimique (School of Economic Warfare).43 It was established 
by the Defense Consultancy International, a semi-public 
company linked to the French Defense Ministry.44 “French 
academics, journalists, retired military and intelligence officials 
work for the school.”45 The school’s director Christian Harbulot is 
quoted as stating:  
[T]he U.S. is the top priority. There is true industrial 
competition and there are many fields where we have 
everything to lose. We cannot let ourselves be pushed around. A 
huge number of companies have disappeared because they were 
bought out or destroyed by the Americans. We have to protect 
ourselves.46
It is evident that the French view the cyber arena as a 
significant resource in satisfying their collection requirements. 
It has been reported as early as 1987 that French intelligence 
co-opted a French hacker by threatening prosecution unless he 
cooperated with their request that he infiltrate the French 
hacking community. French intelligence desired information 
relating to the latest hacking techniques and tools.47 It is highly 
unlikely that the interest exhibited by French Intelligence has 
declined in the intervening years subsequent to this event, and 
40. Id. at 100. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. at 100–01. 
43. See Kelly Uphoff, Tilting the Playing Field: Economic Espionage Hasn’t Gone 




45. French Economic Spies Target U.S., WORLD NET DAILY, Dec. 11, 2004, 
http://www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=41873. 
46. Id. 
47. See JAMES ADAMS, THE NEXT WORLD WAR 160 (Simon & Schuster 1998). 
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with the explosion of spyware and other virtual resources, the 
capabilities of the French intelligence service are presumed to 
have increased in sophistication and effectiveness. 
2. Russia 
During the Cold War, Russian efforts to collect sensitive 
military information were considered the primary intelligence 
threat targeting the United States. A recent article in the 
November 15, 2004 issue of U.S. News & World Report has a 
report stating intelligence insiders furnished information 
revealing that Vladimir Putin had recently increased Russian 
resources targeting the United States to levels reaching the high 
water mark of the Cold War.48 However, current collection 
efforts are aimed at trade and manufacturing secrets of major 
U.S. corporations, like IBM and ExxonMobil, with the intent of 
obtaining information relating to contracts that corporate 
America is pursuing. The United States’ involvement in the War 
on Terror is perceived as a major distraction facilitating these 
collection efforts.49  
This information makes incidents like the one occurring in 
October 2000, where Microsoft staff noticed a problem with new 
accounts being created that did not match their audit logs, 
potentially more significant.50 In researching the anomaly, it 
was discovered that an employee received an e-mail carrying a 
worm and inadvertently installed it.51 The worm, subsequently 
identified as the QAZ worm, functioned as a backdoor tool giving 
remote users control of an infected PC.52 After gaining entry to 
the infected computer, the worm disguised itself as a 
48. Paul Bedard et al., The Reds Are Dead, But the Spies Are Still Around, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 15, 2004, at 10. Russia is also targeting other countries. 
See, e.g., German Intelligence Worried About Increasing Russian Espionage, GLOBAL 
NEWS WIRE, Feb. 3, 2005. 
49. Bedard, supra note 48, at 10. 
50. John Schwartz, Irregular New Accounts Alerted Microsoft to Network Intruder, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2000, § 1, at 28. 
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NOTEPAD.EXE file and could be spread through the network as 
a shared resource.53 The worm then sent a remote signal to a 
computer in Asia identifying the location of the newly infected 
computer54 and also, according to some analysts, automatically 
downloaded and installed various hacking tools from another 
remote site.55 The intruder then used a program to collect 
passwords and automatically sent them to an e-mail address in 
Russia.56 Using the collected passwords, the intruder posed as a 
Microsoft employee working at a remote location and accessed 
sensitive proprietary information.57 It cannot be conclusively 
established if this action was state-sponsored; however, this 
does not lessen the significance of this espionage activity since 
the loss of sensitive information was the ultimate result. 
An incident like this, referred to as worm-based espionage, 
establishes that it is not necessary for a collector to “hack” a 
computer directly, but rather, it may employ virtual agents 
(worms) to perform the penetration and report back to the case 
officer. The utilization of virtual agents poses significant 
challenges to those responsible for security countermeasures 
and complicates the legal remedies traditionally intended to 
serve as deterrents. Virtual agents are not constrained by 
international borders. Consequently, when remotely deployed, 
their detection and subsequent investigation may involve multi-
national investigative coordination, jurisdictional disputes, and 
legislative disparity with respect to whether a criminal act has 
been committed. 
53. Id. 
54. Charles R. Fagg, QAZ, SANS Inst., Aug. 6, 3002, at 3, http://www.sans.org/rr/ 
whitepapers/malicious/47.php. 
55. Ted Bridis & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Hacked! Code Stolen?, ZDNET, 
OCT. 26, 2000, http://news.zdnet.com/2100-9595_22-525083.html. 
56. Id. 
57. George A. Chidi, Jr. & Laurea Rohde, Microsoft’s Network Suffers Hack Attack, 
NETWORK WORLD, Oct. 27, 2000, http://www.networkworld.com/news/2000/1027 
bighack.html. 
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3. Japan 
Japan’s economic espionage and intelligence collection 
activities directed against the United States are unique in 
several respects. The Japanese government has a limited formal 
intelligence organization; however, its major corporations, in 
conjunction with the Japanese Ministry of International Trade 
and Industry (MITI), have active corporate intelligence 
organizations that collect economic and political information. 58 
Japan has used human sources within U.S. corporations, bribed 
corporate employees to purchase proprietary data, and used 
Japanese graduate students and researchers to collect sensitive 
information from universities and research institutes.59  
An example of Japanese researchers involved in espionage 
activities occurred in May 2001, when Japanese researchers 
Hiroaki Serizawa and Takashi Okamoto were indicted on 
charges of stealing genetic materials pertaining to Alzheimer’s 
disease from the Cleveland Clinic Foundation in May 1999. A 
plea bargain resulted in a reduction of charges against Serizawa 
from industrial espionage to one count of perjury. Okamoto 
resigned from the clinic in July 1999 and returned to Japan. The 
58. See, e.g., Christopher G. Blood, Comment, Holding Foreign Nations Civilly 
Accountable for Their Economic Espionage Practices, 42 IDEA 227, 230 (2002). 
Japanese agents, operating out of the Japanese consulate in San Francisco, 
worked with a researcher at Fairchild Semiconductors in Silicon Valley to 
steal corporate plans and secrets on computer developments. As much as 
160,000 pages of confidential information may have been passed through 
consular officials to Japanese corporations that were in competition with 
Fairchild. Indirect support for such activities by foreign governments is not 
uncommon. As early as 1972, the Japanese Parliament established the 
Economics Industry Deliberation Council to direct intelligence gathering. 
Oversight of this council was by the Ministry for Trade and Industry, which 
decades earlier had been the conduit for the Japanese government to 
subsidize worldwide travel by thousands of Japanese businessmen for the 
purpose of gathering information on foreign technological advances. By the 
late 1980s, a CIA classified report indicated that more than three-fourths of 
Japan’s intelligence resources were aimed at acquiring secrets and 
information on technological advances from the United States and Western 
Europe. 
Id. 
59. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5. 
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United States claimed Okamoto acted with the intent of 
profiting by delivering the materials to Japan’s Institute of 
Physical and Chemical Research, popularly known as RIKEN. 
RIKEN employed Okamoto after he returned to Japan.60
In another incident, a Japanese television network (NHK) 
played a prominent role in aiding Japanese corporate and 
governmental interests in penetrating the trade secrets of 
American biotechnology firms.61 Using the pretense of a 
documentary film to gain access to several biotechnology firms, 
NHK personnel, attempted to film proprietary information 
processes and documents.62 Detailed interview data was solicited 
from scientists relating to their research activities and combined 
with film footage permitting NHK to obtain significant insights 
into the technologies, R&D activities and strategic capabilities of 
these firms.63
Estimates that eighty-five to ninety percent of intelligence 
collected by Japanese government and industry sources is 
economic information largely based on proprietary data have 
been reported by publications such as “The OPSEC Journal.”64 A 
1987 CIA report identified two top Japanese intelligence 
priorities as 1) intelligence relating to access to foreign sources 
of raw materials and 2) detailed information on technological 
and scientific developments in the United States and Western 
Europe.65 “The report states that nearly eighty percent of all 
Japanese intelligence assets are focused on gathering technical 
and economic information from the United States and Europe.”66
Currently, a debate is occurring in Japan with respect to 
the legality of deploying cyber weapons. The Japanese 
60. Tetsuya Morimoto, First Japanese Denial of U.S. Extradition Request: 
Economic Espionage Case, 20 No. 7 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 288 (2004). 
61. See William M. Fitzpatrick, Uncovering Trade Secrets: The Legal and Ethical 




64. OPERATION SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5. 
65. Jeff Augustini, From Goldfinger to Butterfinger: The Legal and Policy Issues 
Surrounding Proposals to Use the CIA for Economic Espionage, 26 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 
459, 478 (1995). 
66. Id. (discussing the Congressional Cox Committee Report). 
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Constitution prohibits its military from engaging in offensive 
operations. Determining whether the deployment of computer 
viruses and hacking techniques is considered an offensive 
military tactic requires clarification. However, there is no 
prohibition against using cyber tactics to elicit sensitive 
information. Published reports reflect that the Japanese Self 
Defense Forces have budgeted for the establishment of a 
cyberforce. It would be highly unusual if capabilities developed 
for this cyberforce are not deployed. It is conceivable that virtual 
assets developed for the self-defense forces could be provided to 
private sector intelligence gathering organizations for 
operational use. 
4. China 
In 1999, the Congressional Cox Committee Report on the 
People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) espionage activities directed 
at the United States was released.67 This document provided a 
comprehensive examination of Chinese espionage targeting 
various U.S. industries for the express purpose of accelerating 
the acquisition and development of dual-use science and 
technology intended to enhance Chinese economic performance. 
The Cox Report’s findings include a determination that in 1986 
a major initiative identified as the 863 Program was approved 
by the Chinese leadership to advance the Chinese economy. 
According to the Report, this program produced nearly 1,500 
research achievements by 1996. Approximately 30,000 scientific 
and support personnel were actively engaged on this project.68
Numerous accounts of Chinese economic espionage 
activities have been reported by the press supporting the 
findings of the Cox Report. In its March 22, 1999 issue, 
Newsweek magazine outlined a shopping list of PRC technology 
requirements that included those listed below. A comparison of 
this list and the types of technology reported in legal 
67. Id. 
68. Scott L. Wheeler, How Beijing Gets U.S. Defense Plants, INSIGHT ON THE 
NEWS, Mar. 6, 2003, http://www.insightmag.com/media/paper441/news/2003/03/18/ 
World/How-Beijing.Gets.U.Defense.Plants-384405.shtml. 
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proceedings as being sought by agents of the PRC tends to 




Avionics: Aircraft engines, air frames, gyroscopes and 
simulation equipment and software . . . 
Materials: High-strength polymers and strong plastics used 
in . . . stealth technology . . . 
Supercomputers: Aerospace . . . guidance systems, launchers, 
telemetry technology and . . . communications gear 
Biotechnology: Manipulation of living cells to create new 
drugs . . . 
Medical technology: . . . [P]harmaceuticals and . . . advanced 
equipment for testing and treatment.70 
 
Economic Espionage Incidents 
 
Three Chinese immigrants, two of whom were employees of 
Lucent Technologies, were arrested for attempting to take the 
source code for the PathStar Server, build a company around it, 
and market it in China to a conglomerate officially owned by the 
Chinese government. The subsequent FBI investigation revealed 
e-mails allegedly showing the partners listing intellectual assets 
identical to those of PathStar. Unfortunately for Lucent, the 
investigation further revealed that the source code had been 
conveyed to the Chinese corporation and is unlikely to be 
recoverable.71
In December 2003, a Silicon Valley grand jury indicted Fei 
Ye and Ming Zhong for allegedly conspiring to steal computer-
chip trade secrets from Sun Microsystems, NEC Electronics, 
Trident Microsystems, and Transmeta. The two were allegedly 
involved in a plot to hatch a research project called Supervision, 
which was funded by the Chinese government to finance a high-
69. See Daniel Klaidman et al., Open Secret, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 22, 1999, at 28. 
70. Id. 
71. Massimo Calabresi, The Company of Spies, TIME, May 14, 2001, at 51. 
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tech company that would compete with U.S. chipmakers.72
In a second Silicon Valley case, Qing Jiang was arrested in 
Cupertino, California on charges that he illegally exported 
microwave amplifiers to China. These items are dual-use 
products that can be used for civilian and military applications.73 
“According to the affidavit, the components were being sent to a 
company with the same address as [the Chinese] Ministry of 
Communication[s], Telemetry and Telecontrol, also known as 
the 54th Research Institute, which develops missile-guidance 
systems.”74
The close correlation between the Newsweek “shopping list” 
and the items targeted by Chinese representatives described in 
the legal sampling provided is indicative of an organized 
collection effort targeting sensitive U.S. information. It can be 
surmised that for every successful legal intervention relating to 
these collection efforts, an undetermined number of covert 
operations never detected by U.S. law enforcement agencies are 
likely to have occurred. 
5. Germany 
German targeting efforts aimed at sensitive or proprietary 
information have not received the degree of public reporting that 
characterizes those countries publicly identified in the 1996 CIA 
public report. However, despite not being publicly identified by 
the CIA, several writers have accused Germany of using 
computer-intrusion techniques to gather information on foreign 
competitors with the intention of passing this information to 
German corporations.75 These reports further allege that “[t]he 
German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) [has] created a 
classified, computer intelligence facility outside [of] Frankfurt 
72. Edward Iwata, More U.S. Trade Secrets Walk Out Door with Foreign Spies, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-02-12-espionage_x.htm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
73. Laurie J. Flynn, Chinese Businessman acquitted of Illegal High-Technology 
Exports, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 2005, at C15. 
74. Edward Iwata, More U.S. Trade Secrets Walk Out Door with Foreign Spies, 
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2003-02-12-espionage_x.htm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
75. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5. 
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designed to permit intelligence officers to enter . . . networks 
and databases from countries around the world.”76 This program 
is alleged to have been code named RAHAB and to have 
accessed computer networks in the United States as well as 
other countries.77
Anecdotal evidence supporting German collection activity 
became public in 1991 when IBM accused the German 
intelligence service of eavesdropping on its telecommunications 
and passing this information to German competitors. IBM lost 
several significant business opportunities at this time and 
speculated that these losses were likely due to inside 
information obtained by German competitors in this fashion.78 
Other reports point to 1970 as the year the BND was given a 
mandate to collect more information within the United States.79 
The breakup of the former Soviet Union has permitted the BND 
to focus its efforts on economic intelligence, and consequently, 
the United States has become its primary economic intelligence 
target.80
6. Israel 
Israel is unique in that it has a special relationship with the 
United States extending to its inception. However, there has 
never been any doubt that Israeli interests are not subjugated 
by this relationship to the extent that its perceived national 
security interests are compromised. Israel views itself as being 
in a permanent state of war and, consequently, deploys its 
intelligence services in a very aggressive manner. A former 
intelligence official was quoted in the September 3, 2004 issue of 
the Los Angeles Times, stating, “There is a huge, aggressive, 
ongoing set of Israeli activities directed against the United 
States. Anybody who worked in counterintelligence in a 
professional capacity will tell you the Israelis are among the 
most aggressive and active countries targeting the United 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Peter Schweizer, Op-Ed., Our Thieving Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 23, 1992, at 
A21. 
79. Augustini, supra note 65, at 481. 
80. See id. 
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States.”81 Several anecdotal incidents are presented to illustrate 
the aggressive nature of Israel’s intelligence services. 
An article appearing in the Washington Times on December 
16, 2004 is the most recent charge in a long running history of 
published reports alleging Israeli espionage activities directed at 
the United States. The article reports that Israeli defense 
officials in the United States have been accused by the FBI of 
industrial espionage. The Israeli Defense Ministry denied that 
its representatives have been accused of industrial espionage 
but acknowledged that the U.S. government has complained 
about overly insistent information-gathering by Israelis at 
military equipment exhibitions.82 A Defense Ministry spokesman 
maintained that no accusations were made, but rather asserted 
concern about the aggressive collection of information that was 
not classified.83 The Israeli spokesman, however, did 
acknowledge that some of the information is still protected by 
U.S. officials, and this served to create a grey area that became 
the source of friction.84
The Wall Street Journal reported in 1992 that Israeli agents 
attempted to steal Recon Optical’s top secret airborne spy 
camera.85 Recon Optical, an Illinois company, received a contract 
from the Israeli Air Force to manufacture aerial reconnaissance 
cameras. The terms of the contract permitted Israel to have 
members of its Air Force on site at Recon’s manufacturing 
facility. Israeli Air Force Officers were observed by company 
security officials attempting to remove Recon Optical trade 
secrets from the plant in violation of the contractual 
agreement.86
In a third instance receiving minimal publicity, foreign 
reporting sources Jane’s Information Group and Le Monde both 
81. Bob Drogin & Greg Miller, Israel Has Long Spied on U.S., Say Officials, L.A. 
TIMES, Sep. 3, 2004, at A1. 




85. Israeli Spying: The Mother of All Scandals, http://www.whatreally 
happened.com/motherofallscandals (last visited Nov. 4, 2005). 
86. See Blood, supra note 58, at 230. 
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commented on the absence of U.S. news organizations to follow 
up on a story reported by Fox News.87 This story reported that 
the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) and other members of 
the U.S. intelligence community were concerned about the 
dominance of highly sensitive areas of U.S. telecommunications 
by Israeli companies Verint (formerly Comverse Infosys) and 
Amdocs.88 These firms provided U.S. law enforcement agencies 
with wiretapping equipment and software record-keeping data 
of virtually all calls placed by the twenty-five largest U.S. 
telephone companies.89 Speculation that the hardware and 
software permitted “catch gates,” which comprise the content of 
wiretaps, was responsible for the concern of U.S. officials.90 
DEA’s alleged intense interest was prompted by its 1997 
purchase of twenty-five million dollars in interception 
equipment from Israeli companies.91
7. South Korea 
The Defense Intelligence Agency has reported that South 
Korean economic espionage activities directed against the 
United States “have included stealing information from 
computerized databases maintained by U.S. government 
agencies and U.S. companies.”92 South Korea is alleged to 
aggressively pursue its economic espionage activities by 
accessing closed source environments utilizing electronic access, 
physical access and access to personnel to obtain proprietary 
information.93  
South Korean intelligence officers are purported to be 
“extremely active in collecting political, economic, and 





91. Id. For more on Israel’s economic espionage efforts, see, e.g., Ed Blanche, With 
Friends Like These. . ., THE MIDDLE EAST, Jun. 30, 2002. 
92. OPERATIONS SECURITY, supra note 30, § 5. 
93. Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined, 57 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 303, 306 (1997). 
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technological secrets.”94 The best-known public example of this 
collection effort was the apprehension and conviction of U.S. 
citizen and Navy employee Robert Kim. Court documents 
indicated that Mr. Kim’s dealings with the “South Koreans 
focused on his knowledge of a classified computerized command 
system that linked ships to satellites.”95 The South Korean 
National Planning Agency is technically proficient, well funded 
and has a well-organized network of informers who are paid 
large sums for their efforts in collecting proprietary 
information.96 In addition to assigning members of its 
intelligence service to its overseas embassies under diplomatic 
cover, South Korean intelligence agents are also given 
nonofficial cover positions with South Korean industrial 
conglomerates such as Hyundi, Samsung, and others.97  
D. Business/Competitive Espionage 
Competitive espionage has two aspects: the legal and 
ethical pursuit of information that is of value in the day-to-day 
activities by businesses attempting to gain a competitive 
advantage and the unethical or illegal pursuit of information 
relating to a competitor’s products or information. In essence, 
both types of activity are characterized by intelligence collection 
methods and operations. It is the mechanics of these operations 
that distinguishes their legality.  
The majority of business entities today have some form of a 
competitive intelligence organization. Typically, these 
operations may be formally labeled as “competitive intelligence” 
departments by large corporations, or their functions may be 
accomplished more informally by marketing or other 
departments within smaller organizations. Ultimately, their 
location on an organizational chart is irrelevant. Their mission 
is intended to enable decisionmakers to more effectively manage 
information that will enhance the competitive position of the 
94. Id. 
95. David Johnston, Korean Spy Case Called More Serious than was Thought, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 3, 1996, at A8. 
96. Edwin Fraumann, Economic Espionage: Security Missions Redefined, 57 PUB. 
ADMIN. REV. 303 (1997). 
97. Id. 
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company. It is interesting to note that competitive intelligence is 
a body of knowledge that has attained professional status, with 
a governing body requiring its membership to adhere to strict 
levels of professional ethics.98 The Society of Competitive 
Intelligence Professionals (SCIP) is a global nonprofit 
membership organization for individuals involved in creating 
and managing business knowledge. Competitive intelligence, as 
defined by SCIP, is the legal and ethical collection and analysis 
of information regarding the capabilities, vulnerabilities, and 
intentions of business competitors.99  
Collecting information for capability and vulnerability 
analysis can be accomplished ethically by utilizing data-mining 
techniques, patent tracking, war game exercises, psychological 
profiling of competitor decisionmakers, and attending industry 
trade shows.100 The process of remaining cognizant of a 
competitor’s intentions coupled with the ability to recognize 
unanticipated market developments can be facilitated by 
effective use of the Internet and mass media.101 These methods, 
when supplemented by recurring conversations with customers, 
suppliers, partners, employees, industry experts, and other 
knowledgeable parties, enable information gathering to be 
accomplished successfully within ethical parameters.102
Unfortunately, not all efforts to collect business information 
are conducted in accordance with the SCIP guidelines for ethical 
behavior. Ethics are compromised when traditional espionage 
tradecraft is employed to gather data on targeted business 
adversaries. Techniques utilized to induce a breach of confidence 
on behalf of a targeted individual may include 
misrepresentation, bribery, fraud, improperly obtaining 
financial data from third parties, illicit access, wiretapping, and 
a variety of Internet collection tools. The cyber techniques that 
98. See Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org/ 
2_faq.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
99. Society of Competitive Intelligence Professionals, http://www.scip.org/2_ 
overview.php (last visited Jan. 29, 2006). 
100. Stephen H. Miller, Competitive Intelligence—An Overview, COMPETITIVE 
INTELLIGENCE, at 3–4, http://www.scip.org/Library/overview.pdf. 
101. Id at 4. 
102. Id. 
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can be deployed present a significantly greater risk due to the 
pervasive growth of networks used by businesses to store and 
manage sensitive information. In contrast, the collector of 
sensitive information faces a reduced risk in information 
gathering due to the fact that information can be gathered 
remotely. Combining this reduced risk with the fact that many 
cyber attacks are not detected and business are reluctant to 
acknowledge successful attacks, the advantages of cyber 
collection are easily recognizable. Social engineering practices 
combined with tools such as key stroke loggers, viruses, worms, 
and Trojans can all be deployed with great effect.  
E. Scope of the Problem 
A 2002 survey sponsored by PriceWaterhouseCoopers and 
the American Society of Industrial Security (ASIS), titled 
“Trends in Proprietary Information Loss,” is an attempt to 
quantify the magnitude of the problem.103 Computer hackers and 
foreign intelligence services were identified as significant risks. 
The experience of ASIS council members suggests that these 
groups represent the greatest threat to an organization’s 
proprietary information, which reinforces the necessity of 
examining new approaches in confronting the challenge of cyber 
information collection operations.104
Cyber tactics employed by adversaries are fundamentally 
similar to traditional methods involving fraud, deception, covert 
access, insider recruitment, vendor visits, and specialized 
technical operations. However, each of these tactics has its 
potential effectiveness magnified when current technology is 
used to leverage its impact. 
These tactics are illustrated by incidents like the one 
reported in August 2002, when Niku Corporation discovered its 
server logs contained information that an IP address belonging 
to Business Engine, a competitor, had used Niku passwords to 
access the company’s network more than 6,000 times.105 In 
103. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & ASIS FOUND., 
SURVEY REPORT, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION LOSS 26 (2002). 
104. Id. 
105. Joel McNamara, Secrets of Computer Espionage: Tactics and 
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excess of 1,000 documents were downloaded during the 
intrusions. Compromised information contained data about 
upcoming features, lists of potential customers, and pricing and 
sales.106 The ensuing FBI investigation revealed that since 
October 2001, outsiders had logged onto the internal Niku 
network using fifteen different accounts and passwords to access 
proprietary information.107
The future is likely to be replete with similar cyber 
collection techniques used to target sensitive information. It is 
not difficult to anticipate that current Phishing schemes 
intended to generate cash could easily be configured for 
purposes of industrial espionage. Deceptive websites replicating 
various divisions of a corporation would not be difficult to 
construct. Information requested for ostensibly legitimate 
purposes, if elicited, could be used to access other more sensitive 
sites. This entire process could be accomplished remotely with 
minimal risk even in the event the Phishing site was actually 
discovered. The same counterfeit site could be used to download 
Trojans containing spyware programs. An employee following 
instructions believed to be disseminated by corporate authorities 
could inadvertently download keystroke loggers, password 
grabbers, or other malware, which would reveal passwords 
providing access to sensitive files. The possibilities for using 
known cyber techniques to accomplish espionage goals are 
limited only by the imagination of the perpetrators.  
Distributed denial of service attacks (DDoS), viruses, and 
bot networks could also be deployed in efforts to impede a 
competitor’s efforts to compete or to extort cash. Law 
enforcement agencies have begun to informally advise industry 
counterparts, collaborating within Electronic Crime Task Forces 
or the Infragard Membership Alliance, of an increase in the 
number of cyber extortion incidents.108 One such case reported in 
the Wall Street Journal involved an entrepreneur who allegedly 
employed third parties to launch DDoS attacks against three 
Countermeasures 5 (Wiley Publishing, Inc. 2003). 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. See Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement, supra note 20, at 52–53. 
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competitors.109 Using bot-virus software, five to ten thousand 
hijacked computers were directed to attack the designated 
target competitors. According to the legal complaint, the three 
targeted companies suffered damages estimated to exceed two 
million dollars. Computer Economics Inc., a research firm in 
Aliso Viejo, California, estimated that the cost of viruses in 
terms of lost revenue and repair has increased from thirteen 
billion dollars in 2003 to seventeen and one half billion dollars in 
2004.110 Despite the highly subjective nature of these cost 
estimates, the fact that the trend reflects an ongoing increase is 
not in dispute. 
F. Criminal Espionage 
Criminal activities intended to obtain intellectual property 
or sensitive information are traditionally characterized by a 
profit motive derived by exchanging information for cash or 
receivables easily convertible to cash. These actions were 
typically crimes of opportunity whereby disgruntled or former 
employees availed themselves of insider access to procure 
information of value and market it to interested third parties. 
Frequently, the distinctions between purely criminal motives 
and competitive espionage were blurred. This was due to the 
marketability of the data obtained being limited primarily to 
competitors or state-sponsored agents performing their duties in 
an attempt to assist indigenous enterprises to compete in the 
global marketplace.  
Terrorists employing asymmetric tactics targeting critical 
infrastructure sectors have added a new dimension to the scope 
of the problem. Critical infrastructure sectors were recognized 
as prime targets, and consequently, the intellectual property 
and sensitive information maintained by these infrastructure 
sectors have become legitimate terrorist objectives. The 
vulnerability of these targets to cyber reconnaissance and attack 
techniques challenges the effectiveness of law enforcement’s 
traditional investigative practices. Cyber collection 
109. Cassel Bryan-Low, Growing Number of Hackers Attack Web Sites for Cash, 
WALL STREET J., Nov. 20, 2004, at A1. 
110. Id. 
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methodologies circumventing traditional security counter-
measures and law enforcement practices have made gathering 
sensitive data easier. Cybercrime’s lack of historic 
characteristics crucial to today’s law enforcement model relating 
to proximity, scale, physical constraints, and patterns requires 
the application of innovative security countermeasures and law 
enforcement strategies. The traditional “reactive” approach to 
criminal/terrorist incidents will not be successful in achieving 
the goal of mitigating detrimental impact to critical 
infrastructure sector customers and the accompanying negative 
economic consequences caused by service disruptions.  
A collaborative approach to the protection of sensitive 
critical infrastructure information will be required to counter 
digital collection techniques. Law enforcement agencies lack the 
expertise needed to independently address advancing software 
developments in spyware, keystroke loggers, password crackers, 
and the variety of malware being developed by criminal 
elements. The fact that these criminal elements are emerging in 
geographic locations ranging from Brazil to Eastern Europe and 
the Former Soviet Union, and are capable of launching their 
criminal operations remotely demonstrates the changing nature 
of criminal espionage. A key characteristic of traditional crime—
proximity between victim and offender—is no longer a 
requirement for the targeting of sensitive critical infrastructure 
information.111 Spyware and keystroke loggers can be inserted 
into networks by insiders or by Trojan software downloaded 
surreptitiously and written for the express purpose of permitting 
remote access to sensitive data present on information 
networks.112
DDoS attacks are becoming a preferred extortion method of 
organized criminals taking advantage of the absence of scale 
permitted by the wholesale harvesting of computers for attack 
purposes. Anecdotal reporting from law enforcement officers 
participating in Electronic Crime Task Forces indicates 
organized crime gangs are contracting out cyber disruption 
111. Brenner, A New Model of Law Enforcement, supra note 20, at 1–9. 
112. See, e.g., Ravi Nessman, Israelis Nab 18 in Computer Espionage Case, A.P., 
May 29, 2005, http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=802259&CMP=OTC-
RSSFeeds0312. 
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services for purposes of extortion. These DDoS attacks are 
accomplished by employing harvesting techniques that use a 
variety of malware to gain control of thousands of computers for 
subsequent attacks by bot networks. Intruders gain 
unauthorized access to systems via backdoors inserted by mass-
mailing worms. This access permits the intruder to execute 
command-and-control software capable of directing these bot 
networks as they execute DDoS attacks. The nature of this type 
of criminal attack presents challenges to law enforcement 
procedures steeped in a tradition of conditioned responses bound 
by physical constraints. Similarly, the evolving nature of digital 
networking has not matured sufficiently to permit the 
recognition of patterns necessary for the application of an 
effective law enforcement methodology. 
III. THE LAW: ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA) 
The EEA is Congress’ attempt to deal with the problem 
outlined in Part II, supra. Subpart III.A reviews the provisions 
of the EEA—its definition of “trade secrets” and its imposition of 
criminal liability on those who steal U.S. trade secrets. Subpart 
III.B examines the systemic and contextual factors that erode 
the EEA’s effectiveness as a tactic for dealing with such activity. 
A. Provisions 
Until 1996, there was no federal statute that specifically 
criminalized economic espionage, that is, the theft of commercial 
trade secrets.113 Federal prosecutors charged those who engaged 
in such activity with various other crimes, including the 
interstate transportation of stolen property or mail or wire 
fraud.114 This approach, however, was ultimately unsatisfactory: 
Because federal prosecutors sometimes had trouble “shoe-
113. See, e.g., COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL § VIII.A (2001), 
http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipmanual/08ipma.htm#VIII.A [hereinafter PROSECUTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL]. “Trade secrets” are defined in the text 
above. 
114. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2000) (governing interstate transportation 
of stolen property); 18 U.S.C § 1341 (2000) (governing mail fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1343 
(2000) (governing wire fraud). 
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horning” the theft of trade secrets into the above statutes and 
because of the increased recognition of the increasingly 
important role that intellectual property plays in the well-being 
of the American economy, Congress enacted the Economic 
Espionage Act of 1996, effective October 11, 1996.115  
Codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839, the EEA criminalizes the 
theft of U.S. trade secrets.116 As Part I noted, the EEA takes a 
traditional approach to economic espionage by treating the 
misappropriation of proprietary economic information as theft 
and criminalizing it.117 The premise is that by prosecuting and  
 
115. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.A. 
116. See id. 
117. See, e.g., 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12208 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) (statement of 
Arlen Specter). Senator Specter stated: 
[A] major problem for law enforcement in responding to the increase in such 
thefts has been a glaring gap in Federal law. For many years, the United 
States has had a variety of theft statutes in the United States Code. These 
laws are derived primarily from the common law of theft. For example, it 
violates Federal law to move stolen property across State lines. In order to 
violate such laws, however, the courts have held that the property stolen 
cannot be intangible property, such as trade secrets or intellectual property. 
In addition, theft usually requires that the thief take the property with the 
intention of depriving the lawful owner of its use. But such a test [is] useless 
when a person copies software and leaves the original software with the 
lawful owner, taking only the secrets on the software but leaving the 
physical property. The lawful owner still has full use of the property, but its 
value is significantly reduced. 
In order to update Federal law to address the technological and economic 
realities of the end of the 20th century, I began working earlier this year 
with Senator [Kohl] and officials from the Department of Justice and the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation on developing legislation. We developed two 
separate bills, that were introduced as S. 1556 and S. 1557. The former bill 
broadly prohibited the theft of proprietary economic information by any 
person. The latter bill was more narrowly drawn to proscribe such thefts by 
foreign nations and those working on behalf of foreign nations. 
At the end of February, I chaired a joint hearing of the Intelligence 
Committee and the Judiciary Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology, and 
Government Information on the issue of economic espionage. Continuing to 
work closely with members of the Judiciary and Intelligence Committees, the 
administration, and various industry groups, Senator [Kohl] and I were able 
to produce the bill the Senate is today considering. 
Id. at S12208. 
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sanctioning those who unlawfully appropriate proprietary 
information, we can deter others from engaging in such conduct. 
1. Trade Secret 
The EEA contains an unusually broad definition of trade 
secrets.118 Under 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3), a trade secret “includes . . . 
all types of information, however stored or maintained, which 
the owner has taken reasonable measures to keep secret and 
which has independent economic value.”119 The EEA 
encompasses intangible property, including “information stolen 
in electronic form or merely memorized, [but] is not intended to 
cover general knowledge or skills learned on a job when an 
employee leaves one company and moves to another in the same 
or similar field.”120
Unlike patents, trade secrets need only be “minimally 
novel.”121 This means “a trade secret must contain some element 
that is not known and sets it apart from what is generally 
118. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.C (noting that the EEA’s definition “is broader than other definitions of trade 
secret,’ including notably the definition . . . in the Uniform Trade Secrets Act”); see, e.g., 
Unif. Trade Secrets Act § 1, 14 U.L.A. 537–51 (Supp. 1986); see also RESTATMENT 
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (2005) (providing an alternate definition of trade 
secret). 
119. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.C; See also 18 U.S.C. § 1839(3) (2000): 
[T]he term “trade secret” means all forms and types of financial, business, 
scientific, technical, economic, or engineering information, including 
patterns, plans, compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, 
prototypes, methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes, 
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored, compiled, or 
memorialized physically, electronically, graphically, photographically, or in 
writing if 
(A) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such 
information secret; and 
(B) the information derives independent economic value, actual or 
potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily 
ascertainable through proper means by, the public . . . . 
120. Onimi Erekosima & Brian Koosed, Intellectual Property Crimes, 41 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 809, 813–14 (2004). 
121. See, e.g., PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 
113, § VIII.B.2.C. 
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known.”122 The key attribute of a trade secret under the EEA is 
that it is information which “is not . . . generally known to, and 
not being readily ascertainable through proper means by, [sic] 
the public.”123 It is not necessary that every aspect of the 
information be confidential; a trade secret can consist of a 
“combination of elements that are in the public domain,” if the 
trade secret itself constitutes “a unique, effective, successful and 
valuable integration of the public domain elements.”124
To qualify as a trade secret, information must also derive 
independent economic value from not being generally known to 
the public.125 The statute does not require that a trade secret be 
valued at a specific jurisdictional amount for criminal liability to 
be imposed upon those who misappropriate it.126 According to the 
U.S. Department of Justice (Department of Justice), 
the value of the trade secret need not be established 
with precision and can be determined through a variety 
of different methods, including: (1) the amount similar 
trade secret information sold for on the legitimate open 
market, if available; (2) a reasonable royalty calculation 
based on what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller 
for the technology in an arms-length transaction; (3) the 
amount of research and development costs expended by 
the trade secret owner; and, (4) as a last resort, the 
thieves’ market price that the defendant actually 
received or paid in exchange for the technology.127
The final requirement for bringing information within the 
EEA’s definition of a “trade secret” is that the owner(s) of the 
122. Id. In the legislative history of the EEA, Congress noted that “[w]hile we do 
not strictly impose a novelty or inventiveness requirement . . . for material to be 
considered a trade secret, looking at the novelty or uniqueness of a piece of information 
or knowledge should inform courts in determining whether something is a matter of 
general knowledge, skill or experience.” 104 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1996) (Managers’ statement for H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Bill). 
123. Prosecuting Intellectual Property Crimes Manual, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.c. 
124. Id. (quoting Buffets, Inc. v. Klinke, 73 F.3d 965, 968 (9th Cir. 1996)). 
125. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
126. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.C. 
127. Id. 
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information must have taken reasonable measures to keep the 
information secret. 128 In this respect, trade secret law differs 
fundamentally from the laws that protect other types of 
property; theft and other statutes do not impose a similar 
requirement.129 To come within the provisions of the EEA, the 
owner of information must have utilized protective measures 
that were reasonable under the circumstances; the nature and 
extent of security employed is not an absolute.130 To impose 
criminal liability for violating the EEA, “prosecutors must be 
able to establish that the security measures used by the victim 
to protect the trade secret were reasonably commensurate with 
the value of the trade secret.”131
According to the Department of Justice, the EEA ensures 
that information does not lose its status as a trade secret as the 
result of disclosures made to law enforcement agencies that are 
investigating or prosecuting an EEA case.132 The Department of 
Justice bases this conclusion on two provisions of the EEA. 
First, section 1835 of title 18 of the U.S. Code authorizes courts 
dealing with EEA prosecutions to “enter such orders and take 
such other action as may be necessary and appropriate to 
preserve the confidentiality of trade secrets, consistent with the 
requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal and Civil 
Procedure, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and all other 
applicable laws.”133 Second, 18 U.S.C. § 1835(2) states that the 
128. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
129. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.c (“[A] defendant can be convicted for stealing a bike even if the victim failed 
to protect it by leaving it unlocked on his front porch.”). 
130. See id.; see, e.g., Reingold v. Swiftships, Inc., 126 F.3d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 1997). 
131. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.c. To that end, “prosecutors should determine the extent of the security used 
to protect the trade secret, including physical security and computer security, as well as 
the company’s policies on sharing information with third-parties.” Id. 
132. 18 U.S.C. § 1835 (2000). As the Department of Justice notes, such disclosures 
are essential if EEA cases are to be successfully prosecuted. Id. 
133. Id. The Department of Justice continues: 
This section is aimed at protecting the victim’s trade secret information 
during . . . a criminal prosecution. Such protection would be unnecessary 
unless it was contemplated that victims would first provide the government 
with the trade secrets for use in the criminal investigation and prosecution. 
In addition to the protection afforded . . . there are additional restrictions on 
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EEA does not prohibit “the reporting of a suspected violation of 
law to any governmental entity of the United States, a State, or 
a political subdivision of a State, if such entity has lawful 
authority with respect to that violation.”134 The Department of 
Justice deduces, from the combined effect of these provisions, 
that “it is unnecessary for federal prosecutors or law 
enforcement agents to sign protective orders with victims before 
accepting trade secret information.”135
2. Offenses 
The EEA creates two different offenses: a § 1831 offense and 
a § 1832 offense, each of which was intended to encompass a 
specific type of activity. The EEA also imposes liability for 
attempts and conspiracies, as explained below. 
 
§ 1831 Offense 
 
Section 1831 of title 18 of the U.S. Code criminalizes 
“economic espionage,” which it defines as a theft of trade secrets 
that benefits a foreign government, foreign instrumentality or 
foreign agent. More precisely, § 1831 makes it a crime to steal, 
copy, download, purchase, or possess a trade secret intending or 
knowing that doing so will benefit a foreign agency.136 The EEA 
the disclosure of trade secret information. . . . As a result, trade secret 
owners who disclose information to law enforcement representatives should 
not be deemed to have waived trade secret protection. 
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2.c. 
For more on the use of protective orders, see id. § VIII.B.9. 
134. 18 U.S.C. § 1833(2)(2000). 
The inclusion of this section, together with 18 U.S.C. § 1835, demonstrates 
that Congress intended to ensure that someone who becomes aware of an 
EEA violation has no disincentive to report criminal activity to law 
enforcement. If disclosures to law enforcement, whether by the owner of a 
trade secret or a third-party, eliminated trade secret protection, 
Congressional intent would be frustrated. 
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2.c. 
135. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2.c. 
136. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831 (2000). Like its counterpart, the § 1832 offense, the 
§ 1831 crime has three basic elements: 
Under either section, to obtain conviction . . . the government must prove 
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defines “foreign instrumentality” as “any agency, bureau, 
ministry, component, institution, association, or any legal, 
commercial, or business organization, corporation, firm, or 
entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, 
commanded, managed, or dominated by a foreign 
government.”137 It defines “foreign agent” as “any officer, 
employee, proxy, servant, delegate, or representative of a foreign 
government.” 138
In a § 1831 prosecution, the “government must show that 
the defendant knew or had a firm belief that misappropriation 
would benefit a foreign entity. When this entity ‘is not, per se, a 
government entity (e.g., a business), there must be evidence of 
foreign government sponsorship or coordinated intelligence 
activity.’”139 The requirement that the conduct has been 
undertaken to benefit a foreign entity “is to be interpreted 
broadly and is not limited to an economic benefit, but includes a 
reputational, strategic, or tactical benefit.”140
For “foreign instrumentalities” such as corporate and other 
business entities, the EEA requires that the instrumentality 
have been “substantially owned” or controlled by a foreign 
government.141 While the EEA does not define “substantially,” 
the Department of Justice takes the position that the use of this 
term “suggests that the prosecution does not have to prove 
complete ownership, control, sponsorship, command, 
management, or domination.” 142 The EEA’s legislative history 
beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the defendant stole, or without 
authorization of the owner, obtained, destroyed or conveyed information; (2) 
the defendant knew or believed that this information was a trade secret; and 
(3) the information was in fact a trade secret. 
PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.2. The 
§ 1832 offense then adds an intentional element: intent to benefit a foreign government, 
foreign instrumentality or foreign agent. See id. 
137. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1) (2000). 
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1839(2) (2000). 
139. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.3 (citing 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)). 
140. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 (1996)). 
141. See 18 U.S.C. § 1839(1). 
142. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.3. 
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states the following: 
Substantial in this context, means material or 
significant, not technical or tenuous. We do not mean 
for the test of substantial control to be mechanistic or 
mathematical. The simple fact that the majority of the 
stock of a company is owned by a foreign government 
will not suffice under this definition, nor for that matter 
will the fact that a foreign government only owns 10 
percent of a company exempt it from scrutiny. Rather 
the pertinent inquiry is whether the activities of the 
company are, from a practical and substantive 
standpoint, foreign government directed.143
Section 1831, therefore, does not apply when “a foreign 
corporation misappropriates the trade secret and there is no 
evidence of sponsorship or coordinated intelligence activity’ by a  
foreign government.” 144Such a corporation could, however, be 
prosecuted under § 1832. 
 
§ 1832 Offense 
 
The offense created by 18 U.S.C. § 1832 shares three 
elements with the § 1831 offense: To obtain a conviction, the 
government must prove that (i) the defendant stole, or without 
authorization of the owner, obtained, destroyed, or conveyed 
information which (ii) the defendant knew or believed was a 
trade secret, and (iii) the information was in fact a trade 
secret.145
Unlike the § 1831 offense, the § 1832 crime does not require 
the government to prove that the defendant acted with the 
intent to benefit a foreign entity to secure a conviction.146 The 
government must, however, prove two additional mens rea 
143. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12212 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996) 
(Manager’s statement for H.R. 3723, the Economic Espionage Bill). 
144. Id. (quoting 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12213 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1996)); see 
David W. Simon, Prosecution of IP Theft Increases; Under the Economic Espionage Act 
and Other Laws, the DOJ is Targeting Stolen Corporate Intellectual Property, NAT’L L.J., 
Aug. 11, 2003, at 15. 
145. See supra note 136. 
146. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.2. 
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elements. First, it must prove that the defendant’s act of 
misappropriating the trade secret “was intended for the 
economic benefit of a person other than the rightful owner 
(which can be the defendant, a competitor of the victim, or some 
other person or entity).”147 The government must also prove that 
the defendant intended to “injure” the owner of the trade 
secret.148 “According to the legislative history of the EEA, this 
provision does not require the government to prove malice or 
evil intent, but merely that the actor knew or was aware to a 
practical certainty that his conduct would cause some 
disadvantage to the rightful owner.’”149 As the Department of 
Justice explains, this requirement should not prove onerous for 
prosecutors: 
By definition, in order for a trade secret to have value, 
it must confer a commercial advantage to the owner. 
Once the information is disclosed to another for the 
recipient’s benefit, the trade secret loses its value. 
Accordingly, in many cases, establishing this element 
may not require additional evidence beyond that 
required to establish that the defendant acted for the 
economic benefit of someone other than the owner. For 
example, when a trusted employee of a computer chip 
manufacturer steals a prototype chip and conveys it to a 
known direct competitor of the owner, the disclosure of 
the information to the competitor may be sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to establish the requisite 
intent.150
The government must also prove another non-mens rea 
element to obtain a conviction under § 1832: that the trade 
secret “is related to or included in a product that is produced for 
147. Id. § VIII.B.4.a; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a) (2000). Consequently, “a person 
who misappropriates a trade secret but who does not intend for anyone to gain 
economically from the theft cannot be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832.” PROSECUTING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.4.a. 
148. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.4.b. 
149. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-788 (1996)); see 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 
150. PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.4.b. 
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or placed in interstate or foreign commerce.”151 This element 
establishes federal jurisdiction.152 As the Department of Justice 
explains, it is usually not difficult to establish the “commerce” 
nexus: 
[W]here the trade secret is related to a product actually 
being manufactured and sold, this element would be 
easily established by evidence of interstate sales. Where 
a product is still in the development phase but is being 
developed to be sold in interstate commerce, the 
victim’s intent to distribute the product in the future 
can be adequately demonstrated either by direct 
witness testimony or by documentary evidence 
describing the intended goals of the project. 153
 
Attempt and Conspiracy 
 
Sections 1831 and 1832 each impose liability for attempting 
and/or conspiring to commit the respective offenses they 
define.154 In United States v. Hsu,155 the Third Circuit held that 
the attempt offense created by § 1832(a)(4) requires that the 
defendant have taken a “substantial step” toward the 
151. 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a); see PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES 
MANUAL, supra note 113, § VIII.B.4.c (“This element encompasses two issues: that the 
trade secret be related to a product, and that the product was produced for or placed in 
interstate or foreign commerce.”). 
152. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.4.c. 
153. Id. Furthermore, it is not difficult to establish the “commerce” nexus for 
products still in the research and development stage: 
It is possible that a defendant might argue that products still in the research 
and development stage are not yet being produced for interstate commerce’ 
because such items are not yet being produced’ for sale. This argument 
should not be persuasive. If this argument were to prevail, much of the 
protection of the EEA would be lost, since a trade secret is often most 
valuable during the development phase. Once the product embodying the 
trade secret is released to the public, the value of the trade secret is often 
lost because the product can be examined and the trade secret obtained or 
deduced. 
Id. 
154. See 18 U.S.C. § 1831(a)(4)-(5) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1832(a)(4)-(5). 
155. 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998). 
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commission of the substantive offense.156 Both of the conspiracy 
offenses specifically require the commission of an overt act.157
The Hsu court also rejected defense arguments that one 
charged with attempt or conspiracy to violate the EEA could 
invoke the defense of legal impossibility.158 The defendants in 
that case, who were charged with both conspiracy and attempt 
under 18 U.S.C. § 1832, argued that they could not be held liable 
if the information they allegedly misappropriated was not, in 
fact, a trade secret.159 The Third Circuit disagreed, noting first 
that under modern law, attempt liability is properly predicated 
on the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. “The 
government can satisfy its burden under § 1832(a)(4) by proving 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant sought to acquire 
information which he or she believed to be a trade secret, 
regardless of whether the information actually qualified as 
such.”160 The Third Circuit also held that legal impossibility is 
not a defense to a charge of conspiracy under § 1832(a)(5) 
because the gravamen of conspiracy is the illicit agreement to 
commit a criminal act, not the actual commission of such an 
act.161 Since the offense of conspiracy is predicated on the 
agreement, it is only necessary that the goals of the conspiracy, 
that is, the theft of actual trade secrets, were objectively 
unattainable.162 At least two other circuits have reached similar 
conclusions.163
 
156. See id. at 202. Since the statute is silent on the issue, the court construed it in 
accordance with the Model Penal Code, which requires a substantial step for the 
imposition of attempt liability. See id. 
157. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(5), 1832(a)(5). 
158. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 202–04. 
159. See id. at 199. 
160. Id. at 203. 
161. See id. at 203–04. 
162. See id. at 203. 
163. See United States v. Lange, 312 F.3d 263, 268 (7th Cir. 2002); United States 
v. Yang, 281 F.3d 534, 541–44 (6th Cir. 2002). 
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Extra-territorial Jurisdiction 
 
Section 1837 of the EEA confers extra-territorial jurisdiction 
in EEA prosecutions.164 It is intended to rebut the presumption 
against the extra-territorial applicability of U.S. laws165 and, in 
that regard, departs from other intellectual property law. 
Neither U.S. copyright nor patent law explicitly incorporates 
extra-territorial jurisdiction.166 Section 1837 states that the 
provisions of the EEA apply: 
to conduct occurring outside the United States if (1) the 
offender is a natural person who is a citizen or . . . 
resident alien of the United States, or an [entity] 
organized under the laws of the United States or a 
State or political subdivision thereof; or (2) an act in 
furtherance of the offense was committed in the United 
States.167
B. Enforcement 
“[R]isks remain small, while potential rewards 
skyrocket.”168
This subpart examines issues that undermine the EEA’s 
effectiveness as a means of dealing with economic espionage. 
Subpart III.B.1 describes how systemic factors—forces 
influencing the criminal justice process in the United States—
164. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837 (2000). 
165. See PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CRIMES MANUAL, supra note 113, 
§ VIII.B.10. As the U.S. Supreme Court has stated: 
It is a longstanding principle of American law ‘that legislation of Congress, 
unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’ . . . This ‘canon of 
construction . . .’ serves to protect against unintended clashes between our 
laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord. 
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 
(1991) (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949) and citing 
McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S. 10, 20–22 (1963)). 
166. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Trade Secrets—The New Risks to Trade 
Secrets Posed by Computerization, 28 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 227, 234 (2002). 
167. See 18 U.S.C. § 1837. 
168. James Srodes, Washington Seeks Terrorists While Allies Steal Trade Secrets, 
WORLD TRADE, Apr. 2002, at 12, available at 2002 WLNR 10520016. 
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impede its enforcement. Subpart III.B.2 examines contextual 
factors—the environment in which economic espionage occurs. 
As noted earlier, the EEA approaches economic espionage as a 
type of crime.169 Therefore, it incorporates traditional 
assumptions about crime in the physical world—assumptions 
that do not hold when criminal activity moves online—into a 
virtual environment.170 The influence of these assumptions 
therefore makes the EEA an increasingly problematic strategy 
for dealing with online economic espionage. 171
1. Systemic Factors 
Initially, enforcement of the EEA proceeded cautiously. An 
early version of the Act included the requirement that all 
prosecutions be approved by the Attorney General.172 While this 
provision was not included in the final version, then-Attorney 
General Janet Reno sent the Senate a letter in which she 
promised that the Department of Justice would not, “for a period 
of five years after implementation of the Act,” file charges under 
the EEA “without the personal approval of the Attorney 
General, the Deputy Attorney General, or the Assistant 
Attorney General for the Criminal Division.”173 Reno’s letter also 
pledged that this requirement would be “implemented by 
published regulation,”174 and it was. Section 0.64-5 of title 28 of 
the Code of Federal Regulation, which remained in effect until 
October 11, 2001, incorporated the approval requirement and 
169. See supra subpart III.A; see also infra subpart III.B.2. 
170. See infra subpart III.B.2. 
171. See infra subpart III.B.2. 
172. One reason for adding the requirement was apparently a concern that the 
statute would be misused to “interven[e] in commercial disputes best handled through 
civil litigation.” Memorandum from U.S. Attorney Gen. John Ashcroft Renewing the 
Approval Requirement for § 1831 Prosecutions under the Economic Espionage Act of 
1996 (Mar. 1, 2002), http://www.cybercrime.gov/eea1996.htm [hereinafter Ashcroft 
Approval Requirement Memo]. Another concern was the potential international 
consequences of filing a case under § 1831. See, e.g., John Mangels, Clinic Case is First 
Use of New Law, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, July 30, 2001, at A1, available at 2001 WLNR 
250929. 
173. Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 142 CONG. REC. S12201, S12214 (daily ed. 
Oct. 2, 1996) (letter from Attorney General Reno). 
174. Id. 
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declared that violations of the requirement “are appropriately 
sanctionable and will be reported by the Attorney General to the 
Senate and House Judiciary Committees.”175
The original approval requirement implemented 
encompassed prosecutions under both § 1831 and § 1832.176 That 
requirement expired on October 11, 2001, but it was restored by 
then-Attorney General Ashcroft.177 In March of 2002, Ashcroft 
issued a memorandum in which he “revive[d] the prior approval 
requirement for initiating prosecutions under § 1831 . . . .”178 
Under the revived policy, such prosecutions must be approved 
by the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of 
the Department of Justice.179 Ashcroft chose not to revive the 
approval requirement for prosecutions under § 1832, but he 
“strongly urge[d]” prosecutors to consult with the Department of 
Justice’s Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section 
“regarding § 1832 prosecutions prior to filing charges.” 180 Since 
Ashcroft’s memorandum did not set an expiration date for the 
approval requirement, it remains in effect.181
Since the Economic Espionage Act was first passed in 1996, 
the Department of Justice has prosecuted forty-seven people in 
thirty-four cases.182 The Department filed its first prosecution 
under § 1831 in May of 2001, shortly before the original 
approval requirement expired.183 After that requirement expired, 
175. 28 C.F.R. § 0.64-5 (2000). 
176. See id.; see also supra subpart III.A.2. 
177. See Ashcroft Approval Requirement Memo, supra note 172. 
178. Id. 
179. See id. 
180. Id. 
181. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-
90.020(A), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/90mcrm.htm# 
9-90.020. 
182. Paul Elias, Espionage Act Proves Difficult to Prosecute, SAN DIEGO UNION-
TRIBUNE, Aug. 5, 2002, at A4, available at 2002 WLNR 11191024. For a detailed 
statistical review of the few prosecutions brought under the EEA, see Michael L. Rustad, 
The Trouble with the Economic Espionage Act: Straining Out Gnats, Swallowing Camels, 
22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH-TECH L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
183. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, First Foreign Economic Espionage Indictment (May 8, 2001), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/Okamoto_SerizawaIndict.htm. Foreign 
nationals are also prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1832. See, e.g., Hsu, 155 F.3d 189. 
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the Department began bringing more cases,184 but the number of 
EEA prosecutions is small compared to prosecutions for other 
intellectual property violations.185
There are several reasons for the relative paucity of EEA 
prosecutions. One is that the statute was new in 1996, and it 
took a while for prosecutors and investigators to learn how to 
apply the new law.186 That, of course, was a transient 
phenomenon which cannot account for the relative scarcity of 
prosecutions almost a decade after the EEA was enacted. 
A factor of continuing importance is the complexity of the 
cases. As one reporter noted, EEA cases are “thick with scientific 
jargon and processes that take time for prosecutors . . . to sift 
through.”187 EEA cases tend to involve complex, novel 
technologies that are case-specific. This, aside from anything 
else, differentiates them from other intellectual property cases, 
such as prosecutions for file sharing and copyright piracy. 
Another factor is the Department of Justice’s desire only to 
bring cases it can win.188 In renewing the approval requirement 
184. See, e.g., Robin J. Effron, Note, Secrets and Spies: Extraterritorial Application 
of the Economic Espionage Act and the Trips Agreement, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1491 
(2003). According to one source, the Department of Justice had brought a total of forty 
EEA prosecutions by February 2003. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORTED CRIMINAL 
ARRESTS AND CONVICTIONS UNDER THE ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT OF 1996, 
http://my.execpc.com/~mhallign/indict.html (last visited Jan. 31, 2006)([hereinafter 
REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS]. The Department of Justice’s website lists twenty-seven 
prosecutions for the period 2000–2004. See COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE ACT (EEA) CASES, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/eeapub.htm (last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
185. Compare REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS, supra note 184, with U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CASES, http://www.cybercrime.gov/ipcases.htm (last 
visited Jan. 31, 2006). Writing in 2001, a reporter noted that “[b]y 2000, the FBI had 
more than 800 ongoing economic espionage investigations. But fewer than 25 of the 
probes had resulted in criminal charges.” Mangels, supra note 172. As of 2002, ninety-
two EEA cases had been referred for prosecution. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT 2002, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2004), 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipt02.pdf [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
THEFT]. Compare this with the 210 referrals for copyright offenses and the 103 referrals 
for trademark crimes during the same period. See id. Copyright and trademark cases 
were more likely actually to be prosecuted. See id at 4. 
186. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172. 
187. Id. 
188. See Ashcroft Approval Requirement Memo, supra note 172. 
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for § 1831 prosecutions, Attorney General Ashcroft noted that an 
“indication of the measured and thorough approach the 
Department [of Justice] has taken with respect to investigating 
and charging theft of trade secrets [was the fact that] there has 
not been an acquittal under the EEA since passage of the 
legislation.”189 That is no longer true; in 2002, for example, the 
conviction rate in economic espionage prosecutions was seventy-
five percent.190
A factor specific to § 1831 prosecutions, which accounts for 
the fact that they are quite rare, is the diplomatic repercussions 
of bringing forth such a claim.191 It is this concern that prompted 
Attorney General Ashcroft’s retaining the approval requirement 
for these prosecutions. As a reporter covering the first § 1831 
prosecution noted, such a “case is potential diplomatic 
dynamite”192 because it necessarily involves allegations that a 
foreign government was involved in the misappropriation of 
trade secrets.193 While § 1832 prosecutions target a type of 
traditional, individual crime, a § 1831 prosecution alleges the 
commission of state-sponsored crime.194 The implications of 
189. Id. 
190. See INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT, supra note 185, at 5. The conviction rate 
for copyright cases was ninety-five percent, and eighty-five percent for trademark cases. 
See id. 
191. See, e.g., REPORTED CRIMINAL ARRESTS, supra note 184. 
192. Mangels, supra note 172. 
193. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the §1831 offense). 
194. The term “state-sponsored crime” denotes crimes the commission of which is 
carried out by, or with the acquiescence of, a sovereign state. See, e.g., Barbara M. 
Yarnold, Doctrinal Basis for the International Criminalization Process, 8 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 85, 109 (1994). 
The first category of “state crimes” are crimes that involve state-sponsorship. 
This type of crime cannot be perpetrated without such sponsorship. The 
second category includes crimes that are conducted with state acquiescence. 
In other words, the criminal condition can only exist due to the implicit 
acceptance of the crime by the state in which it is perpetrated. The third 
category of state crimes includes those crimes that are committed by public 
officials on behalf of the state or with explicit state authorization. Finally, 
the fourth category includes those crimes that can only be conducted by 
states or that have only been conducted by states in the past. 
Id. While the phrase “state-sponsored crime” usually refers to internal crime, i.e., crimes 
a state commits against its own citizens, it can also refer to external crime, i.e., State A’s 
involvement in crimes committed against citizens of State B. See, e.g., Raquel Aldana-
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lodging such a claim have led the Department of Justice to be 
particularly cautious in bringing cases for economic espionage.195
A final, more general factor also contributes to the relative 
paucity of EEA prosecutions: the “inherent tension between the 
statute and defendants’ constitutional protections.”196 In one of 
the first EEA prosecutions,197 the Department of Justice sought 
a comprehensive protective order that would severely limit the 
defense’s access to documents concerning the trade secrets 
which the defendants allegedly sought to obtain.198 In support of 
its motion, the government argued: 
First . . . it has a legitimate interest in protecting the 
integrity and confidentiality of trade secrets . . . . 
Second, it contends that in the absence of in camera 
review and redaction, the defendants will receive 
information that is irrelevant and immaterial to their 
defense . . . . Third, the Government raises the specter 
of “graymail,” which occurs when defendants press for 
the release of sensitive information and then threaten 
publicly to disclose the information in an attempt to 
force the Government to drop its charges . . . .199
Pindell, In Vindication of Justiciable Victims’ Rights to Truth and Justice for State-
Sponsored Crimes, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1399, 1408 (2002). For more on this, see 
infra Part IV. 
195. See, e.g., Mangels, supra note 172. 
196. United States v. Hsu, 982 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1997), rev’d on other 
grounds, 155 F.3d 189 (3d Cir. 1998). 
197. The case was brought under § 1832 even though the defendants were foreign 
nationals. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 193. 
198. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023. 
199. Id. One of the reasons the Department of Justice raised the “graymail” issue 
was its concern that a protective order might be of little use. See id. at 1026 (“The 
Government can . . . be forgiven for not reposing much trust in defendants who it 
contends are linked to wrongdoers far removed from the borders of our contempt 
power.”). According to one source, the tactic could have worked: “After the district court 
denied the government’s proposed protective order, Assistant United States Attorney 
Richard Goldberg announced that if the court’s ruling were upheld, he would take 
further steps to prevent the trade secrets from being revealed, possibly even dismissing 
the case.” Susan V. Metcalfe, Comment, Protecting Trade Secrets: Is the Remedy Worse 
than the Wrong?, 104 DICK. L. REV. 503, 518 (2000) (citing Frances A. McMorris, 
Corporate-Spy Case Rebounds on Bristol, WALL. ST. J., Feb. 2, 1998, at B5). This has led 
some commentators to question the EEA’s effectiveness, especially in a prosecution for 
substantive crimes. See, e.g., Dennis J. Kelly & Paul R. Mastrocola, The Economic 
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The defendants claimed that only a less restrictive 
protective order would permit them to prepare an effective 
defense. 200 In granting the defense’s request, the district court 
noted the tension between the requirements of the EEA and 
certain constitutional provisions: 
[I]f . . . we deny to the defendants complete access to 
the . . . technology, we inhibit their constitutional right 
to effective cross-examination as well as their right to 
have a jury . . . determine whether a “trade secret” 
exists . . . . [I]f we grant the defendants complete access 
to the . . . technology, we impair the very purpose of the 
EEA. When faced with such a choice, . . . “the 
constitution . . . must govern.” 
Therefore, while we recognize that the . . . technology 
documents require some measure of protection, we 
cannot give them a perfect shield without violating the 
defendants’ . . . rights under the Fifth and Sixth 
Amendments.201
The government appealed to the Third Circuit, which 
avoided this issue by finding that the defendants were charged 
only with inchoate crimes: attempt and conspiracy to violate 
§ 1832.202 The Third Circuit held that since impossibility is not a 
defense to either an attempt or conspiracy charge under the 
Espionage Act of 1996, 26 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 181, 190 (2000): 
[T]he requirement to prove the existence of a trade secret under the EEA 
and the attendant possibility of “graymail” raises a serious issue concerning 
the feasibility and efficacy of EEA prosecutions. If a victim company 
ultimately is going to be forced to disclose its trade secrets, it may be 
disinclined to refer a trade secret theft to the government or to cooperate 
with the prosecution if the government initiates an EEA case by means of 
other sources. . . . [R]estrictions imposed by the court on the use and 
disclosure of the trade secret information by the defendants may mitigate 
this problem somewhat, but certainly not to the extent a defendant actually 
goes to trial. 
Id. See also Chris Carr, Jack Morton & Jerry Furniss, The Economic Espionage Act: Bear 
Trap or Mousetrap?, 8 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 159, 189–90 (2000). 
200. See Hsu, 982 F. Supp. at 1023. 
201. Id. at 1025 (citing Marbury v. Madison 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137, 178, 2 L.Ed. 
60 (1803)). 
202. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 198–99 n. 15; see also supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing 
attempt and conspiracy). 
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EEA,203 the defendants had no constitutional right of access to 
documents that would indicate whether they had, in fact, sought 
to purchase a trade secret.204
So far, no reported cases address the issue left unaddressed 
by the Third Circuit, that is, the extent to which a court can 
shield proprietary information in a prosecution for commission 
of a substantive EEA offense.205 Commentators generally 
conclude that the Hsu district court was correct—that there is a 
fundamental, unresolvable tension between a defendant’s 
constitutional right to discovery in a substantive prosecution 
under the EEA and the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 1835.206 Many 
believe this creates a continuing disincentive for companies to 
report being the victims of economic espionage, a disincentive 
which erodes the efficacy of the EEA.207
Even if we were to assume, for purposes of analysis, that the 
Hsu district court and the commentators are wrong and a court 
can protect trade secret information implicated in an EEA 
prosecution, there are other factors that can discourage 
companies from reporting EEA crimes. For example, publicly 
announcing that a trade secret has been compromised can 
negatively affect a company’s stock value. A 2001 empirical 
analysis of the twenty-three EEA prosecutions that had been 
brought to that point found that “public disclosures of trade 
secret theft are on average associated with a negative stock 
market response that is both statistically and economically  
 
203. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing attempt and conspiracy). 
204. See Hsu, 155 F.3d at 201. 
205. It is settled that an essential element of a substantive prosecution is the 
defendant’s appropriating an actual trade secret. See, e.g., United States v. Lange, 312 
F.3d 263, 264–65 (7th Cir. 2002). 
206. See supra note 196; see also supra note 133 and accompanying text. Section 
1835 was included in the EEA to preserve the confidentiality of trade secret information 
implicated in an EEA prosecution. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, H.R. REP. 
NO. 104-788, at 14 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4021, 4033. Congress 
recognized that “[w]ithout such a provision, owners may be reluctant to cooperate in 
prosecutions for fear of further exposing their trade secrets to public view, thus further 
devaluing or even destroying their worth.” Id. at 13. 
207. See supra note 199; see also ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 10. 
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significant.”208 The study concluded the following: 
enough of a track record [exists] to formulate a 
tentative progress report regarding the Act. . . . [O]ne of 
the fears surrounding the passage of the EEA was that 
publicly traded companies might be hesitant to report 
the theft of their trade secrets to the government for 
fear that doing so might adversely affect their stock 
prices. At least at this point, our findings suggest that 
this concern has merit, i.e., the stock market and 
investors care.209
They also noted that their findings “raise the important 
practical question of why an agency should divert and allocate 
scarce budget resources toward a law enforcement mechanism 
that victims may have little incentive to use.”210
A related issue is the likelihood of effective prosecution. 
“[P]rior to the passage of the EEA, the prevailing wisdom was 
that existing . . . laws, not to mention the extraterritoriality and 
enforcement issues, made it virtually impossible to effectively 
prosecute foreign economic espionage.”211 The EEA addressed 
these issues by adding new crimes to the federal criminal code 
and by authorizing extraterritorial jurisdiction over EEA 
violations.212 Unfortunately, the EEA did not, and indeed could 
not, resolve all of the problems that arise in pursuing foreign 
nationals who misappropriate U.S. trade secrets. Perhaps the 
most difficult issue is extradition. As noted earlier, economic 
espionage is by definition state-sponsored crime in that trade 
secrets are stolen at the behest of a foreign sovereign.213 Those 
responsible for such thefts are therefore likely to be foreign 
nationals who are not in the United States when they are 
charged with violating the EEA, either because they left the 
country after committing a traditional act of economic espionage 
208. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 50 (emphasis in the original). 
209. Id. at 51–52. The Annual Report submitted to Congress for 2004 reached a 
similar conclusion. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at x (“US firms have . . . 
been reluctant to raise alarms about possible technology theft out of concern for the 
potential impact on investor and consumer confidence and stock prices.”). 
210. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 52. 
211. Id. at 28 (citing Carr, Morton & Furniss, supra note 199, at 168–70). 
212. See supra subpart III.A.2. 
213. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the § 1831 offense). 
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or because they committed the crime remotely, via cyberspace.214 
In either event, the Department of Justice cannot proceed with 
prosecution unless and until it is able to extradite the offender 
from the country that is harboring him.215
An EEA case involving two “firsts” suggests extradition will 
not be forthcoming in these cases. In the first prosecution under 
18 U.S.C. § 1831,216 Japan refused to extradite one of the 
defendants, a Japanese scientist accused of stealing genetic 
materials from the Cleveland Clinic Foundation to benefit 
RIKEN, the Institute of Physical and Chemical Research funded 
by the Japanese government.217 The Japanese court charged 
with deciding whether the scientist would be extradited found 
that there was no probable cause to believe he had acted with 
the intent to benefit RIKEN, “his new employer.”218 It was “the 
first time in the 24-year history of the Japan-U.S. extradition 
treaty that Japan has refused to extradite a fugitive.”219 Since 
there is no appeal from the Japanese court’s decision, the denial 
effectively ended the prosecution.220 The result in this case seems 
to be anything but an aberration.221
The individual and combined effect of the systemic factors 
discussed above is to erode the EEA’s effectiveness as a weapon 
against economic espionage. It is a solution in promise, but not 
in fact. The next subpart examines contextual factors that 
further undermine the EEA’s utility as a means of discouraging 
economic espionage. 
214. See supra subpart II.B. 
215. See, e.g., Morimoto, supra note 60, at 288. 
216. See supra subpart III.B.1. 
217. See, e.g., Morimoto, supra note 60; see also Mangels, supra note 172. 
218. Morimoto, supra note 60. 
219. Id. 
220. See id. 
221. See, e.g., Srodes, supra note 168, at 12 (“[S]ix years [after enactment of the 
EEA], there have only been a few dozen indictments and prosecutions and many of the 
accused have high-tailed it back to their home countries where their governments refuse 
to extradite them.”). 
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2. Context 
In adopting the EEA, Congress chose to approach economic 
espionage as a type of crime, to be investigated and prosecuted 
using the methods we use for other, more traditional types of 
crime.222 What Congress did not anticipate was that the EEA 
came into existence at a time when crime, in all its guises, was 
about to undergo a radical transformation—one that has 
significant consequences for our ability to combat it effectively 
with traditional law enforcement strategies.223 As the Parts 
below explain, crime is increasingly migrating online, into 
cyberspace. This shift, in the context in which criminal activity 
occurs, requires that we re-think how we deal with crime, 




Crime threatens social order, and societies must maintain a 
baseline of internal order if they are to endure.224 Societies use 
222. See, e.g., Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 1996 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4034, 4034–35 (statement by President William J. Clinton upon signing 
H.R. 3723). 
This legislation makes the theft or misappropriation of trade secrets a 
Federal crime . . . . Trade secrets are an integral part of virtually every 
sector of our economy and are essential to maintaining the health and 
competitiveness of critical industries operating in the United States. 
Economic espionage and trade secret theft threaten our Nation’s national 
security and economic well-being.  
Until today, Federal law has not accorded appropriate or adequate protection 
to trade secrets, making it difficult to prosecute thefts involving this type of 
information. . . . 
This Act will protect the trade secrets of all businesses operating in the 
United States . . . from economic espionage and trade secret theft and deter 
and punish those who would intrude into, damage, or steal from computer 
networks. I am pleased to sign it into law. 
Id. 
223. See, e.g., Susan W. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace: 
Distributed Security, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2, 6–11 (2004) [hereinafter Brenner, 
Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace]. 
224. Id. at 8–10. 
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rules to maintain order.225 “A rule is a compulsory principle that 
governs action and inaction; [it] specifies which actions are 
allowable and which are not.”226 Societies use two types of rules 
to maintain order: constitutive and proscriptive (criminal).227 
Civil constitutive rules define the structure of a society by 
defining relationships among those who comprise that society; 
they also allocate essential tasks among the members of the 
society and ensure that the tasks are performed.228
Historically, societies have been bounded systems situated 
in a delimited spatial area and composed of a defined populace 
(for example, “the people of Rome”). These constraints facilitate 
the operation of the constitutive rules. Spatial and demographic 
isolation make it easier to socialize members of a society so that 
most members accept and abide by its constitutive rules; they 
also make it easier to identify and suppress those who do not.229
Because societies are composed of intelligent entities who 
can ignore rules, they cannot rely only on constitutive rules to 
maintain order.230 Societies, therefore, implement a second set of 
rules—”criminal rules”—which target rule-violators.231 These 
rules impose criminal (proscriptive) liability and sanctions upon 
those who do not abide by constitutive rules.232 Societies assume 
that sanctioning rule-violators maintains order by preventing 
violations. This basic assumption incorporates two subordinate 
assumptions: (i) sanctions deter violations by presenting us with 
a simple choice—obey rules or suffer the consequences, and (ii) 
rule-violators will be identified, apprehended, and sanctioned.233
For purposes of analysis, we will assume the validity of the 
first assumption, as our concern is with the second assumption. 
Under the second assumption, if criminal rules are to maintain 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 6. 
227. Id. at 21, 34. 
228. Id. at 17–18, 36–40. 
229. See id. at 49–52, 58–60. 
230. Id. at 39–41. 
231. See id. at 41–42. 
232. Id. at 43. 
233. See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, 
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 7 (1967). 
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order, there must be a system in place that ensures rule-
violators are identified, apprehended, and sanctioned. There 
must be a credible threat of retaliation for violating criminal 
rules; absent such a threat, they cannot discourage deviance and 
maintain order. For most of human history, societies relied upon 
citizens to maintain this threat.234 That began to change in 1829 
when Sir Robert Peel created the London Metropolitan Police.235 
The Metropolitan Police was something new: an independent 
agency staffed by full-time professionals whose sole task was to 
maintain order by reacting to crimes and apprehending the 
perpetrators.236 Peel’s model spread around the world, the 
consequence being that in the twenty-first century, we, as 
citizens, assume no responsibility for maintaining order.237 That 
is the sole province of professionalized police forces that ensure 




Because real-world crime occurs in a physical environment, 
it has four characteristics that are relevant to this discussion: 
proximity, scale, physical constraints, and patterns.239 Perhaps 
the most fundamental characteristic of real-world crime is that 
the perpetrator and victim are physically proximate to each 
other when the offense is committed or attempted. For instance, 
it is not possible to rape or realistically attempt to rape someone 
if the rapist and the victim are fifty miles apart. In a 
nontechnological world, it is physically impossible to pick 
someone’s pocket, rob them, or defraud them out of their 
234. See id. at 59–65. 
235. See David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1165, 1202–1203 
(1998–1999). 
236. Id. at 1202–04. 
237. See, e.g., William D. Eggers & John O’Leary, The Beat Generation: 
Community Policing at Its Best, 74 POL’Y REV. 1 (1995), available at 
http://www.policyreview.org/fall95/thegg.html. 
238. See, e.g., DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL 
ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY 34 (2001) (assuming crime control “must be a 
specialist, professional task of •law enforcement’”). 
239. The analysis in this subpart is taken from Brenner, Toward a Criminal Law 
for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 49–57. 
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property if the thief and victim are in different cities, states or 
countries. 
The scale of real-world crime is limited: It tends to be one-to-
one crime, involving one perpetrator and one victim. The crime 
begins with the victimization of the target and ends when the 
victimization is concluded. During the event, the perpetrator 
focuses all of her attention on consummating that crime; when it 
is complete, she can move onto another crime and another 
victim. Like proximity, the one-to-one character of real-world 
crime derives from the constraints physical reality imposes upon 
human activity: A thief cannot pick more than one pocket at a 
time; a forger cannot forge more than one document at a time; 
and prior to the rise of firearms. It was very difficult for one to 
cause the simultaneous deaths of more than one person. Real-
world crime, therefore, tends to be serial crime. 
Real-world crime is also subject to the physical constraints 
that govern activity in the physical world. Every crime, even 
street-level drug dealing or prostitution, requires a level of 
preparation, planning, and implementation if it is to succeed. A 
bank robber must visit the bank to familiarize herself with its 
layout, security, and routine; this exposes her to public scrutiny 
and that can lead to her being identified and apprehended. 
While in the bank, she leaves trace evidence and is subject to 
observations that can result in her being identified. As she flees 
after committing the robbery, she is again exposed to public 
view and risks being identified. In addition to these obvious 
risks, she probably had to secure a weapon and a disguise before 
the robbery and needed help disposing of the cash afterward. 
Each step takes time and effort, which incrementally augments 
the exertion required to commit the crime and increases the 
risks involved in its commission. 
Finally, over time it becomes possible to identify the general 
contours and incidence of the real-world crimes committed in a 
society. Victimization tends to fall into demographic and 
geographic patterns for two reasons. First, only a small segment 
of a functioning society’s populace will persistently engage in 
criminal activity. Those who fall into this category are apt to be 
from economically deprived backgrounds and reside in areas 
that share geographic and demographic characteristics. They 
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will be inclined to focus their efforts on those with whom they 
share a level of physical proximity because they are convenient 
victims; consequently, much of a society’s routine crime will be 
concentrated in identifiable areas. Second, each society has a 
repertoire of crimes—rules that proscribe behaviors ranging 
from more to less serious in terms of the harm each inflicts. 
Theft causes a loss of property; murder causes a loss of life, and 
so on. In a society that is successfully maintaining internal 
order, the more egregious crimes will occur much less often and 
less predictably than minor crimes. 
These characteristics shaped the crime-control strategy 
incorporated in the current model of law enforcement. Proximity 
contributed a presumed dynamic: victim-perpetrator proximity 
and consequent victimization; perpetrator efforts to flee the 
crime scene and otherwise evade apprehension; investigation; 
identification; and apprehension of the perpetrator. The 
dynamic reflects a time when crime was parochial, when victims 
and perpetrators tended to live in the same village or 
neighborhood. If a victim and perpetrator did not know each 
other, they were likely to share community ties that facilitated 
identification and apprehension. Thus, there was a good chance 
a perpetrator could be identified by witnesses or reputation. If a 
perpetrator and a victim did not share community ties, he would 
“stand out” as someone who did not belong, which would likely 
contribute to his being apprehended. Law enforcement dealt 
effectively with this type of crime because its spatial limitations 
mean investigations were limited in scope. The strategy still 
assumes that the investigation of a crime should focus on the 
physical scene of the crime. 
The crime-control strategy assumes one-to-one victimization 
that, along with another assumption, yields the proposition that 
the scale of crime will be limited in a functioning society. The 
other assumption is that crimes are extraordinary events—that 
law-abiding conduct is the norm and crime is unusual. This 
second assumption derives not from the physical characteristics 
of real-world crime, but from the need to maintain order. A 
society’s constitutive and proscriptive rules work together to 
achieve this; the constitutive rules define the acceptable 
behaviors that are encouraged, while the proscriptive rules 
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emphasize that certain behaviors will not be tolerated. 
Individuals are socialized to accept the constitutive rules as 
prescribing the correct standards of behavior. Proscriptive rules 
reinforce this by emphasizing that the behaviors they condemn 
are not only bad, but they are unusual, extraordinary, and 
outside the norm. The combined effect of these rules is that 
crime becomes a subset, generally a small subset, of the total 
behaviors in a society. The limited incidence of criminal 
behavior, coupled with one-to-one victimization as the default 
crime mode, means law enforcement personnel can focus their 
efforts on a limited segment of the conduct within a given 
society. 
The crime-control strategy also incorporates the concept that 
crime falls into patterns, and that it will be limited in incidence 
and in the types of harms it inflicts. It also assumes that an 
identifiable percentage of crime will occur in geographically and 
demographically demarcated areas. The combined effects of 
localized crime and the differential frequency with which 
various crimes are committed gives law enforcement the ability 
to concentrate its resources in areas where crime is most likely 




Online crime, or cybercrime, is illegal activity that involves 
the use of computer technology.240 Unlike real-world crime, 
cybercrime does not require any degree of physical proximity 
between victim and perpetrator for the consummation of an 
offense.241 The victim and perpetrator can be in different cities, 
states or countries; all a cybercriminal needs is a computer 
linked to the Internet. 
Furthermore, one-to-one victimization is not typical of 
cybercrime: Unlike real-world crime, online crime can be 
automated, which means perpetrators can commit thousands of 
240. See Susan W. Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?, 4 CAL. CRIM. 
L. REV.1, ¶ 3 (2001), available at http://boalt.org/CCLR/v4/v4brenner.htm [hereinafter 
Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?]. 
241. The analysis in this subpart is also taken from Brenner, Toward a Criminal 
Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 65–74. 
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crimes quickly and with little effort. One-to-many victimization 
is the default assumption for cybercrime. Under the strategy 
outlined in subpart III.B.2 (Real-World Crime), officers react to 
a crime by investigating and apprehending its perpetrator; the 
strategy assumes crime is committed on a limited scale so 
officers can react to discrete crimes. Cybercrime violates this 
assumption in two ways. First, although cybercrime is carried 
out by a small percentage of the population, this relatively small 
group can commit crimes on a scale far surpassing what they 
could achieve in the real-world. The total number of cybercrimes 
will therefore exponentially exceed real-world crimes. Second, 
cybercrime is added to the real-world crime with which law 
enforcement must continue to deal; people will still rape, rob, 
and murder in the real-world. These factors combine to create 
an overload in that law enforcement’s ability to react to 
cybercrime erodes because the resources that were minimally 
adequate to deal with real-world crime are totally inadequate to 
deal with cybercrime-plus-real-world-crime. 
Cybercriminals also avoid the physical constraints that 
govern real-world crime; funds can be extracted from a U.S. 
bank and moved into offshore accounts with little effort and less 
visibility. The reactive strategy is far less effective against 
online crime because the reaction usually begins well after the 
crime has been successfully concluded and the trail is cold. 
Another problem is that since most or all of the conduct involved 
in committing the crime occurs in an electronic environment, the 
physical evidence, if any, is evanescent and volatile. By the time 
police react, evidence may have been destroyed, advertently or 
inadvertently. Since perpetrators are seldom present at the 
crime scene, assumptions about their having been observed 
while preparing for, committing or fleeing from the crime no 
longer hold. Indeed, officers may not be able to determine from 
where the perpetrator carried out the crime or who he is; 
cybercriminals, unlike their real-world counterparts, can enjoy 
perfect anonymity or perfect pseudonymity. Even if officers can 
identify the perpetrator of a cybercrime, gathering evidence and 
apprehending him can be difficult. The country that hosts him 
may not regard what he did as illegal and may therefore decline 
to extradite him, or there may be no extradition treaty in place 
that governs the conduct at issue. 
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Finally, we cannot, at least as of yet, identify offender-
offense patterns comparable to those we have for real-world 
crime. Several factors account for this. First, cybercrime is not 
well documented. Even if agencies track cybercrimes, they tend 
not to break them out into separate categories. Cyberfraud, for 
example, is usually listed as fraud. Second, it can be difficult to 
parse cybercrime into discrete offenses: Is a virus that causes 
billions of dollars of damage in many countries one crime, 
several crimes or thousands of crimes? The most important 
factor, though, is the lack of accurate statistics. Cybercrimes are 
often not detected, and if they are detected, many cybercrimes 
are not reported to the authorities. 
 
Online Economic Espionage 
 
What is true of generic cybercrime is also increasingly true 
of economic espionage. As subpart II.B explained, economic 
espionage is increasingly moving online: 
Only a few years ago, stealing customer information 
was a cumbersome task. One example is Jose Lopez, the 
former executive at General Motors, who was indicted 
by a federal grand jury in Detroit for allegedly stealing 
boxes of confidential and proprietary information in 
1993 from General Motors and transferring them to his 
new job at Volkswagen. Today, there is . . . no need to 
steal boxes of paper documents. The information . . . 
is . . . stored on computers. Such information can be 
instantly sent anywhere in the world via the Internet.242
As economic espionage moves online, it takes on the 
characteristics of cybercrime and becomes ever-more resistant to 
traditional law enforcement efforts.243
Economic espionage’s resistance to law enforcement efforts 
is further exacerbated by a contextual characteristic it does not 
share with other types of cybercrime: Economic espionage is 
state-sponsored crime.244 In contrast, our current model of law 
242. Carr & Gorman, supra note 23, at 31 (notes omitted) (citing Christian Tyler, 
The Enemy Within, FIN. TIMES (London), Apr. 12, 1997, at 1). 
243. See supra Parts II.B, III.B.2 (discussing online crime). 
244. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
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enforcement assumes crime is the local product of individual 
effort. This assumption derives from the physical constraints 
that govern real-world crime; as explained above, these 
constraints become irrelevant when crime, including economic 
espionage, moves online. 245
The assumption that crime is the product of individual effort 
also derives from the strictures of the real-world. For millennia, 
human groups used physical boundaries—territory—to insulate 
themselves from threats posed by other human groups.246 With 
the rise of nation-states, the concept of territory became fixed; 
each nation-state occupied a specific, defined territory and 
assumed the responsibility to protect its citizens from internal 
threats (crime) and external threats (war).247 The two categories 
remained discrete until relatively recently, when technology 
began to make physical boundaries irrelevant and to blur the 
distinction between crime and war.248 Economic espionage is 
often characterized as a type of warfare;249 while it does not 
involve a physical attack upon a nation-state’s territory,250 it 
does represent an attack by one sovereign upon the essential 
interests of another.251
Economic espionage is at once “crime” and “not-crime.” Like 
crime, it inflicts various types of harm upon members of a 
society. Thus, like online theft, economic espionage harms 
citizens by diminishing the value of assets they have acquired 
245. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime). 
246. See Brenner,  Toward a Criminal Law for Cyberspace,  supra note 223, at 
106–09. 
247. Id. 
248. See, e.g., John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, The Advent of Netwar (Revisited), in 
NETWORKS AND NETWARS: THE FUTURE OF TERROR, CRIME AND MILITANCY 1–22 (John 
Arquilla & David Ronfeldt, eds., 2001). 
249. See, e.g., FIALKA, supra note 34, at 90. See also Robert Loring Allen & Erwin 
D. Canham, SOVIET ECONOMIC WARFARE 28 (1960) (“Economic warfare is defined as the 
conscious attempt to increase the relative economic, military, and political position of a 
country through foreign economic relations.”). 
250. DAVID M. ACKERMAN, RESPONSE TO TERRORISM: LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE USE 
OF MILITARY FORCE, Congressional Research Service CRS-1 (Sept. 13, 2001), 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/6217.pdf (defining “war” as the use or 
threatened use of force by one nation-state against another). 
251. See supra Part II. 
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through legitimate means.252 However, unlike a conventional 
criminal, the perpetrator of economic espionage does not act 
solely for personal gain. Economic espionage is analogous to 
warfare because at the very least, it represents an attempt to 
undermine the security and stability of a sovereign nation.253 
This aspect of economic espionage differentiates it from other 
types of crime in ways that alter the context in which law 
enforcement has traditionally operated.254
As noted above, economic espionage, like cybercrime, 
increasingly violates the assumption that crime is local. The 
perpetrators of economic espionage are often foreign nationals 
who either leave the victim-state after misappropriating trade 
secrets or consummate the act remotely, via cyberspace.255 They 
252. See Brenner,  Is  There  Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, 
¶ 32–49. 
253. See Michelle Van Cleave, Nat’l Counterintelligence Executive, Remarks at the 
Conference on Counterintelligence for the 21st Century: The National 
Counterintelligence Strategy of the U.S. 5–6 (Mar. 4–5, 2005), http://www.nacic.gov/ 
publications/reportsspeeches/speeches/CI21Conf/TexasspeechCI.pdf. 
America’s national defense rests on its continuing technological 
superiority . . . . 
Espionage has long proven the most cost-effective means of defeating U.S. 
capabilities. We may spend billions of dollars to develop a given weapons 
system, the effectiveness of which rests on . . . technological . . . secrets that 
give us advantage. If those essential secrets are stolen, both our investments 
and our advantage can be lost. 
Id. at 5–6. 
254. Though economic espionage is, in certain senses, analogous to an act of war, it 
is unlikely that countries will treat it as an act of warfare. So far, it is the act of one or 
more individuals, rather than the use of military force by another sovereign. See 
ACKERMAN, supra note 250. We are accustomed to approaching acts of espionage, 
including economic espionage’s more sinister counterparts, as crimes. See, e.g., Henry 
Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to Agfhanistan, 29 S.U.L. Rev. 181, 
182–85 (2002). 
255. See supra note 211 and accompanying text; ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 
10, at 1 (“Increasingly, foreign entities need not even come to the United States to 
acquire sensitive technology but, instead, can work within their own borders.”); see, e.g., 
Industrial Spy Arrested in London Probably Worked from Germany, BBC INT’L REPORTS 
(Europe), May 31, 2005. 
A suspected industrial spy, who was arrested in London last week, probably 
worked from Baden-Wuerttemberg. . . . This was reported by the Federal 
State Office of Criminal Investigations (LKA) in Stuttgart . . . . The 41-year 
old computer expert was reportedly the mastermind of a group that spied on 
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are, therefore, not in the victim-state when its law enforcement 
officials seek to react to an economic espionage crime by 
arresting, prosecuting and sanctioning those responsible. 
Nation-states long ago evolved processes for ensuring that 
those who flee a jurisdiction after committing conventional 
crimes can be returned to face justice. For centuries, countries 
have used the process of extradition to return fleeing criminals 
to the jurisdiction in which they committed their crimes.256 
Bilateral treaties are the means used to implement extradition; 
each party to the treaty agrees to extradite those whom the 
state requesting extradition has charged with or convicted of an 
extraditable offense.257 Extraditable offenses can be specifically 
defined in the treaty or, more often, the treaty will encompass 
crimes that are punishable by the laws of both parties with a 
specific degree of severity.258 The nation-state seeking 
extradition submits a request, with supporting documents, to 
the country harboring the fugitive. If that country grants the 
request, it arranges for the fugitive to be surrendered to the 
country seeking extradition.259
While it is cumbersome,260 this process works reasonably 
well for conventional crimes because the conduct involved in 
these crimes threatens the stability of all states.261 As long as a 
state is assured that certain procedural requirements are met, it 
will cooperate in seeing that one who fled justice in another 
state is returned for prosecution and/or incarceration. 
This process is unlikely to work for economic espionage. The 
internal information of industrial companies via the Internet. 
See id.; see also CY4OR: Tackling the Tactics of Cyber Spies, M2 PRESSWIRE, Sept. 7, 
2004. 
256. Monica L. McHam, Comment, All’s Well That Ends Well: A Pragmatic Look at 
International Criminal Extradition, 20 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 419, 430–31 (1997-1998). 
257. Id. at 31; see, e.g., Extradition Treaty with Lithuania, U.S.-Lith. Oct. 23, 2001, 
S. TREATY DOC. No. 107-4 (2001). 
258. See, e.g., id. art. 2(1). 
259. See, e.g., id. arts. 8, 12(3). 
260. See, e.g., Thomas G. Snow, The Investigation and Prosecution of White Collar 
Crime: International Challenges and the Legal Tools Available to Address Them, 11 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 209, 235–43 (2002) (discussing a few of the legal and political 
hurdles faced during the extradition process). 
261. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order and real-world crime). 
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conduct involved in economic espionage departs from the 
conventional crime model in that it does not threaten the 
stability of all nation-states. Economic espionage is predicated 
on the emerging dynamic of cross-border victimization. Cross-
border victimization is common in conventional cybercrime, 262 
but it takes on a unique aspect in economic espionage because 
the state itself is involved in the crime. Agents of State A 
victimize citizens of State B to confer a competitive advantage 
upon State A. Since the agents act to benefit State A, neither 
they nor their conduct pose a threat to the stability of that state 
or to any other state that relies upon scientific and technological 
advancements for competitive and tactical advantages. Most 
nations, therefore, do not regard economic espionage as a 
particularly serious matter. Even the United States “has no 
specific national legislation that would prohibit espionage 
against other nations.”263
The effects of this laissez-faire attitude toward economic 
espionage are exacerbated by the unique position a requested 
state is in when another country, say the United States, seeks 
extradition or other assistance in pursuing someone charged 
with economic espionage. When conventional crime is involved, 
the state from which assistance is requested is, in essence, a 
neutral party. That is, while the state may have concerns about 
the regularity of the process, it has no stake in the dispute 
between the person whom it harbors and the state that seeks 
assistance.264 The generic harms encompassed by conventional 
crimes threaten all states.265
The situation is very different when state-sponsored crime is 
involved. If the economic espionage was committed for the 
benefit of the state from which assistance is requested, it is no 
longer a neutral party; it now has a conflict of interest. Assume 
the United States asks State A to extradite Suspect X, whom the 
262. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime). 
263. Blood, supra note 58, at 233. 
264. When the person is a citizen of the state from which assistance is requested, 
that state may approach the request with special care, focusing on issues such as the 
penalties that can be imposed and the extent to which the person’s rights will be 
protected in any criminal proceedings. See e.g., Snow, supra note 260, at 235–40. 
265. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order and real-world crime). 
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United States has charged with economic espionage. If the 
espionage was undertaken to benefit State A, then State A is the 
beneficiary of the crime for which extradition is being sought. If 
State A encouraged or otherwise sponsored the crime, it is an 
accomplice in the commission of that crime. In either case, it is 
in State A’s best interest to decline extradition, if only to limit 
publicity concerning its role in the offense. The same conclusion 
holds, perhaps to a lesser extent, when assistance is requested 
for other purposes, such as evidence-gathering. 
While the EEA may be a useful approach to the domestic 
theft of trade secrets,266 it is a futile attempt at dealing with 
economic espionage—especially online economic espionage. The 
next Part considers how we can improve our approach to this 
problem. 
IV. THE FUTURE 
We don’t want to . . . discover, years and years after the 
fact, that while we have investigated every reported 
security breach, spies have stolen our secrets . . . .267
The source of the EEA’s futility in dealing with online 
economic espionage is its reliance on the reactive model of law 
enforcement. 268 Law enforcement’s ability to react effectively to 
criminal activity, including economic espionage, erodes 
dramatically when that activity moves online. The fundamental, 
operational assumptions that structure the reactive model do 
not apply to online crime. 269 The erosive effects of this failure of 
assumptions are exacerbated by state involvement in economic 
espionage because the resulting conflicts of interest make it 
exceedingly unlikely that the culpable state will render 
assistance to a country seeking to bring the perpetrator(s) of 
economic espionage to justice. 270
266. See supra subpart III.A.2 (discussing the § 1832 offense). 
267. Van Cleave, supra note 253, at 4–5. 
268. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime and online economic 
espionage). 
269. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online crime and online economic 
espionage). 
270. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage). 
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Logically, we have two alternatives for improving our 
approach to economic espionage:271 We can improve the reactive 
model of law enforcement’s applicability to online crime, 
including economic espionage, or we can implement a different 
approach that supplements the reactive model. 
A. Improved Reaction 
An obvious way to improve law enforcement’s ability to react 
to online crime, including economic espionage, is to increase the 
number of officers available to react and the resources they 
utilize in reacting to online crime.272 However, there are two 
problems with this option. First, societies already find it difficult 
to allocate the resources needed to support law enforcement 
agencies. Therefore, it is improbable that they can summon the 
resources needed to recruit, train and equip enough officers to 
make the reactive strategy a viable approach to online crime 
while retaining its viability for real-world crime. Second, since 
online crime is automated, there is no guarantee that simply 
increasing the number of officers will improve the efficacy with 
which law enforcement can react. Certain factors suggest that 
adding officers is unlikely to improve law enforcement reaction. 
Since online activity tends to be less visible, economic espionage 
often goes undetected.273 Furthermore, since online activity can 
be automated, a perpetrator can commit serial acts of economic 
espionage while officers are still attempting to react to his initial 
effort. 
271. For an argument as to how civil liability can be used to this end, see Rustad, 
supra note 182.
272. See Susan W. Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law 
Enforcement, 9 INT’L J. COMMS. L. & POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 18 (2004), available at 
http://www.digital-law.net/IJCLP/Cy_2004/pdf/Brenner_ijlcp-paper.pdf [hereinafter 
Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement]. 
273. See, e.g., Van Cleave, supra note 253, at 6: 
The most successful espionage—the kind that goes undetected—is all the 
more effective, because what is not known cannot be remedied. And the risks 
are growing. The marvels of modern information technology and 
microelectronics have revolutionized espionage tradecraft, enabling the 
clandestine extraction of vast volumes of data in miniaturized storage media 
or across computer networks at the press of a “send” button. 
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Another option is to react differently, by striking back at 
those who commit online crime. Writing in a different context, 
Professor Reidenberg proposed that nations authorize their law 
enforcement officers to use “electronic sanctions” to react to 
online crime.274 He argued that states could electronically 
sanction offenders: 
[S]tates may electronically sanction rule offenders by 
using technologies to penalize or destroy the offenders’ 
online presence . . . . [A] state might launch a denial of 
service . . . attack. This is an online death penalty’ and 
prevents an offender from interacting on the [I]nternet. 
A state may also use hacking techniques to ‘seize’ or 
paralyze rule-violating web pages . . . . [T]he state may 
use techniques similar to the MS Blaster worm for law 
enforcement purposes.275
What Professor Reidenberg proposed is an official version of 
an alternative that has been discussed for some time: civilian 
self-help or strikeback techniques that supplement law 
enforcement reactions to cybercrime.276 However, neither the 
official nor the unofficial version of this alternative is an 
acceptable solution. Both create a new type of state-sponsored 
crime,277 and the state-sanctioned use of official or private 
strikeback techniques could be seen as an act of warfare.278
A final option for improving the reactive model’s efficacy 
against economic espionage is to implement the approach the 
Council of Europe has taken in its Convention on Cybercrime 
(Convention).279 The Convention is based on the premise that an 
274. See Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA L. & 
TECH. J. 213, 228–29 (2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=487965 (follow 
“Document Delivery” hyperlink). 
275. Id. at 228 (notes omitted). 
276. See, e.g., Curtis E.A. Karnow, Strike and Counterstrike: The Law on 
Automated Intrusions and Striking Back, BLACKHAT WINDOWS SECURITY, Feb. 27, 2003, 
at 5, http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/win-usa-03/bh-win-03-karnow-notes.pdf. 
277. Id.; see Reidenberg, supra note 273, at 228–29. 
278. See, e.g., Walter G. Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use of Force (1999) (on file with 
Author). 
279. Convention on Cybercrime, Nov. 23, 2001, E.T.S. 185, available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/185.htm [hereinafter Convention on 
Cybercrime]. 
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international network of consistent substantive and procedural 
laws will improve national law enforcement’s ability to react 
across jurisdictional borders, which will restore the effectiveness 
of the current crime control strategy. To that end, the 
Convention seeks to harmonize national laws that define 
various types of cybercrime, authorize mutual assistance in 
evidence-gathering and permit extradition of cybercriminals.280 
However, the Convention does not encompass economic 
espionage,281 and it is doubtful that a comparable treaty 
encompassing economic espionage could be implemented given 
the state involvement in that activity.282 Thus, it seems we have 
little hope of improving the efficacy of law enforcement reaction 
to economic espionage, we must consider alternative 
approaches. 283
B. Prevention 
There are two ways to deal with crime: react to it or prevent 
it. The reactive model of law enforcement discussed above 
incorporates prevention insofar as it is seeks to incapacitate and 
deter offenders; but this is not its primary concern.284 Prevention 
is the primary concern of the community policing model, which 
emphasizes police-civilian cooperation to create a climate in 
which crime is not tolerated.285 We cannot, for various reasons, 
apply the community policing model to online crime.286 We can, 
however, use its focus on prevention to develop a more effective 
approach to online economic espionage. 
Various sources have outlined specific techniques 
individuals and industry can use to prevent economic 
280. See id. at Explanatory Report ¶¶ 1–16. 
281. See id. arts. 2–10. 
282. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage). 
283. Even if we abandon the reactive strategy as our approach to economic 
espionage and other types of online crime, we will still need to retain it. It has proven an 
effective strategy for real-world crime, and there is no reason to believe that will change. 
284. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime). 
285. See, e.g., Barry N. Leighton, Visions of Community Policing: Rhetoric and 
Reality in Canada, 33 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 485, 487 (1991) (on file with Author). 
286. For one thing, the concept of a physical community does not translate into 
cyberspace. See, e.g., Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law 
Enforcement, supra note 272, at 23. 
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espionage.287 This discussion is concerned not with techniques, 
but with how we can implement a paradigm shift, to move from 
relying exclusively on the reactive model as our strategy for 
dealing with economic espionage to a strategy based on 
prevention. Basically, there seem to be three possible 
implementation strategies. 
1. Implementation Strategies 
One implementation strategy is to mandate prevention by 
implementing rules that require businesses to protect their 
trade secrets and by imposing sanctions upon those that do not 
comply.288 However, mandating prevention is a bad idea because, 
in effect, it retains the reactive model and adds another layer of 
enforcement that further stretches already-slim resources.289 If a 
mandatory system is to be effective, someone has to police 
enforcement, that is, check to see if specified prevention 
measures have been implemented and ensure the imposition of 
sanctions when they are not.290
A second implementation strategy is to continue to do what 
we are already doing, that is, make prevention purely 
voluntary.291 This strategy is clearly not working. 
A third and potentially more promising implementation 
strategy is to use civil or criminal liability to create additional 
incentives (beyond the economic incentives that already exist 
and are obviously not compelling) to prevent economic 
espionage. This strategy is analogous to mandated prevention in 
that it imposes consequences for not preventing the 
misappropriation of trade secrets, but it differs in certain critical 
respects. Instead of mandating the implementation of specific 
preventative measures, this strategy would simply create a legal 
duty to prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets and would 
287. See, e.g., PRESIDENT’S INFO. TECH. ADVISORY COMM., CYBER SECURITY: A 
CRISIS OF PRIORITIZATION 37–48 (2005), available at http://www.hpcc.gov/pitac/ 
reports/20050301_cybersecurity/cybersecurity.pdf. 
288. For an analysis of this strategy in a different context, see Brenner, Toward A 
Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 90–94. 
289. Id. at 92–93. 
290. Id. at 91–93. 
291. Id. at 89–90. 
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apply to a defined group, presumably those who own and/or 
control trade secret information. Those encompassed by the duty 
would be under a legal obligation to take reasonable measures to 
protect the trade secrets they control. 
The virtue of this strategy is that it puts the risk of failure 
on those who are in the best position to protect trade secrets. If 
they fail, they are held liable, either civilly or criminally, as 
explained below. While this approach may seem harsh because 
it may seem like blaming the victim, it is in fact a logical way to 
go about changing assumptions. Holding the owners of trade 
secrets liable for the compromise of their information will make 
it clear that they are the first and only line of defense for the 
trade secrets they control. If a preventative strategy is to 
succeed, owners of trade secrets must understand that it is up to 
them to protect that information. In this context we must 
eliminate the assumption that the government or law 
enforcement is exclusively responsible for maintaining the 
security of property. Mandating prevention with specific rules 
and enforcement agencies would tend to perpetuate this 
assumption because the state would be directing the process. 
The state, not the civilian owners of trade secrets, would still be 
assuming primary responsibility for protecting property, 
although in a slightly different guise. Also, like any regulatory 
scheme, mandated prevention could take on a life of its own and 
lead owners of trade secrets to focus more on the process, that is, 
on what is involved in complying with the rules rather than on 
protecting their proprietary information. 
We will therefore assume that the best implementation 
strategy uses civil or criminal liability to hold those who control 
trade secrets liable for the compromise of that information. The 
issue we now need to address is the type of liability that should 
be imposed. 
2. Liability 
The first option is to hold businesses or individuals or both 
civilly liable for not preventing the misappropriation of trade 
secrets in their possession and control. The obvious problem 
with this option is identifying the person who would seek 
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redress because civil litigation is initiated by such a person.292 
We would, therefore, need an injured person, with standing to 
bring the litigation.293 Since owners of trade secrets are at once 
the victims of the misappropriation and the party to be held 
liable for failing to prevent misappropriation, we obviously 
cannot rely on them. When a business is involved, we could let 
the shareholders bring the suit, but there may be disincentives 
for them to do so.294 Another alternative is to let the government 
bring suit as a civil enforcement action analogous to civil 
antitrust enforcement actions.295
The second option is to hold individuals or businesses or 
both criminally liable for defaulting on their obligation to 
prevent the misappropriation of trade secrets. We could not do 
this without modifying and extrapolating certain principles of 
criminal liability. We would be holding the victim of a crime (the 
owner of trade secrets) criminally liable for not preventing 
his/her/its own victimization. We would literally be blaming the 
victim. We currently conceptualize crime as a zero-sum event in 
which the perpetrator bears sole responsibility for the offense. 
We do not incorporate victim fault into our crime calculus, 
presumably due to the influence of the reactive model of law 
enforcement. 296 Under the reactive model, the victim’s fault is 
irrelevant because civilians bear no responsibility for preventing 
crime. We are entitled and obliged to assume law enforcement 
will control crime sufficiently to maintain internal order in the 
society.297
If we wanted to pursue this option, could we eliminate this 
assumption without doing violence to our basic approach to 
criminal law? Could we articulate a justification for treating 
owners of trade secrets differently from, say, owners of 
292. 67A C.J.S. Parties § 6 (2005). 
293. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1442 (8th ed. 2004) (defining standing as a “party’s 
right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right”). 
294. See supra notes 207–08 and accompanying text. 
295. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 7-5.420, 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title7/5mant.htm. 
296. See Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at  
85–87. 
297. See id at 86–87; supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing real-world crime). 
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convenience stores?298
We could base the justification on the status of economic 
espionage as a state-sponsored crime. As noted earlier, economic 
espionage is an act of economic warfare,299 which differentiates it 
from other types of online crime, including conventional theft. In 
conventional theft, the perpetrator acts to benefit himself and, 
perhaps, some associates; thus, the crime is intrinsically 
individual and involves only civilians.300 The state’s interest in 
this type of activity is, therefore, sufficiently vindicated if it is 
able to discourage it with the degree of effectiveness necessary 
to keep it at acceptably low levels within a society.301
Economic espionage represents a different dynamic and 
therefore requires a different calculus. The perpetrator of 
economic espionage directly attacks a civilian victim and, in so 
doing, indirectly attacks the state of which that victim is a 
citizen. Since economic espionage can erode a state’s viability,302 
states have an enhanced interest in this type of criminal 
activity, one that goes beyond discouraging the activity with an 
efficacy sufficient to maintain a baseline of internal order.303 
Criminal law evolved to address only the latter interest.304 We 
therefore have principles of criminal law that address the harm 
to the individual victim,305 but lack principles that would 
encompass the harm to the state and provide the predicate for 
redressing that harm. 
Such a principle must recognize that economic espionage 
inflicts harm both upon the individual victim and upon the 
298. We need a principled justification to distinguish the two because we will 
retain the reactive model of law enforcement for other types of crime. See supra note 283. 
299. See supra notes 249–50 and accompanying text. 
300. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing As Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, ¶ 23. 
301. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order). 
302. See ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, at 1 (“The . . . ability of foreign 
entities to acquire . . . US technology . . . has undermined US national security by 
enabling foreign firms to push aside US businesses in the marketplace and by eroding 
the US military lead.”). 
303. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order). 
304. Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at 35–46. 
305. See, e.g., Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, 
¶ 40 (discussing theft offenses as a means of redressing harm resulting from loss of 
individual property); see also supra subpart III.A.1. 
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state. The harm to the individual victim is the loss in the value 
of the compromised trade secret.306 Conceptually, the harm to 
the individual victim is a mixture of theft (the victim loses part 
of the value of its property) and property damage (the property 
is worth less than it was before). 307 We do not have a vocabulary 
that can describe the harm to the state because we are 
accustomed to thinking of crime as a civilian matter in which 
one citizen harms another. The state’s only interest is to control 
this activity with an efficacy sufficient to maintain internal 
order. 308
Crime is, and will remain, a primarily civilian matter.309 
What we need to realize, though, is that in an era of modern 
transportation and computer technology, crime is not exclusively 
a civilian matter. Conduct that falls within our conception of 
traditional varieties of crime can also inflict harm upon the 
state, and we need to be able to address this distinct, 
incremental harm.310 To do that, we need to be able to articulate 
why the misappropriation of trade secrets inflicts discrete harms 
upon the individual owner and the state in which the owner is a 
citizen. To do that, we need to assess the nature of the property 
at issue in light of the concerns addressed above.311
Unlike the funds in the cash drawer of a convenience store, 
a trade secret cannot be considered purely private property. 
Trade secret data, like other types of information, has become 
306. See supra subpart III.A.1. 
307. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240,  ¶ 44–
47. Misappropriation of a trade secret is analogous to theft in that the perpetrator takes 
something from the victim. In that sense, it is analogous to other intellectual property 
crimes, such as copyright. See, e.g., Geoffrey Neri, Note, Sticky Fingers or Sticky Norms? 
Unauthorized Music Downloading and Unsettled Social Norms, 93 GEO. L.J. 733 (2005). 
Misappropriation of trade secrets is also analogous to property damage crimes like 
vandalism in that the victim still has its property, i.e., the trade secret, but it is now 
damaged goods. See Brenner, Is There Such a Thing as Virtual Crime?, supra note 240, ¶ 
71 (discussing cyber crime as analogous to vandalism in that another’s property is still in 
their possession, but is damaged). 
308. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing order). 
309. See Brenner, Toward A Criminal Law for Cyberspace, supra note 223, at  
31–49. 
310. See generally Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving away from Reactive Law 
Enforcement supra note 272, at 34–35. 
311. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage). 
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part of our critical national infrastructure.312 It is therefore 
reasonable to conceptualize trade secrets as a new type of mixed 
property: information that belongs both to its civilian owner(s) 
and to the state.313 Each has a distinct interest in the property: 
The owner’s primary interest is in utilizing the trade secret for 
commercial purposes; the state’s primary interest is in seeing 
that the trade secret’s value is not compromised by losing its 
status as a secret.314 With this mixed concept of trade-secrets-as-
property, we can address both the harm to the individual 
owner(s) and the harm to the state. Addressing the latter 
requires implementing rules that hold the owners of trade 
secrets criminally liable, perhaps in varying degrees, for not 
preventing their misappropriation.315 The gravamen of such 
liability is not the individual owner’s loss, but the erosion of the 
commercial, tactical, and/or other advantages that accrued to 
the state from the information’s remaining secret.316
The imposition of liability as hypothesized above is not as 
Draconian as it may sound. More than a century ago, American 
criminal law began to use regulatory offenses to create “forward-
looking incentives yielding socially optimal outcomes.”317 While 
312. Presidential Decision Directive NSC-63 (May 22, 1998), 
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-63.htm; see ONCIX 2004 REPORT, supra note 10, 
at 1–2; Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, 
supra note 271, at 35. 
313. See supra subpart III.B.2 (discussing online economic espionage). 
314. These interests are not completely discrete. The owner also has an interest in 
seeing that the secrecy of the information is not compromised, and the state has an 
indirect interest in seeing that it is utilized for commercial purposes. 
315. For the implementation of an analogous type of criminal liability, see Brenner, 
Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 
34–36 (discussing criminal product liability for software manufacturers). 
316. The premise of such liability is analogous to that imposed in criminal 
antitrust proceedings: 
In a traditional criminal proceeding, the state acts to vindicate its obligation 
to protect a member of the social system it represents. In a criminal antitrust 
enforcement proceeding, the state acts to vindicate its obligation to protect 
essential components of the system. The “harm” caused by an antitrust 
“crime” is an erosion of the principle of competition. Criminal antitrust 
proceedings therefore target “systemic” crimes, i.e., crimes that impact upon 
a nation’s infrastructure instead of upon individuals . . . . 
Id. at 35 (notes omitted). 
317. Louis Michael Seidman, Points of Intersection: Discontinuities at the Junction 
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the commission of a regulatory offense does result in the 
imposition of criminal liability, regulatory offenses differ from 
traditional crimes in several important respects. Like the 
liability hypothesized above, they target systemic harms instead 
of the imposition of a specific harm on an individual.318 Since the 
goal is to create incentives to engage in certain socially-desirable 
conduct, they often target a failure to act where the law imposes 
a duty to act.319 Also, conviction of a regulatory offense of the 
type proposed above does not carry the moral stigma or severe 
penalties that are associated with conviction of a traditional, 
common law crime like rape or murder. 320
The primary difference between the criminal liability 
proposed above and the regulatory offenses we currently have is 
that the proposed liability blames the victim. It holds 
individuals and entities criminally liable because they failed to 
prevent their own victimization. The regulatory offenses that 
exist essentially impose liability for not preventing the 
occurrence of conditions that (i) create the potential for 
generalized harms, such as threats to public health and safety, 
or (ii) result in the occurrence of specified systemic harms such 
as environmental damage.321 Thus, they sanction violators either 
for inflicting or creating conditions that can inflict external 
harm, that is, harm directed at someone other than the violator. 
For the reasons noted above, we have not yet sanctioned those 
who create conditions that produce internal harm, that is, the 
victimization of the violator.322
The difference between the two types of regulatory offenses 
is that the criminal liability proposed above is intended to target 
a type of activity distinct from the activities encompassed by our 
Of Criminal Law and the Regulatory State, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 97, 142 
(1996). 
318. See id; see also Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive 
Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 34–36. 
319. See Seidman, supra note 317, at 142; see also Brenner, Distributed Security: 
Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 36. 
320. Seidman, supra note 317, at 142–43; see also Brenner, Distributed Security: 
Moving Away from Reactive Law Enforcement, supra note 272, at 37. 
321. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1975); United States v. FMC 
Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978). 
322 See supra notes 295–96 and accompanying text. 
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current repertoire of regulatory offenses. The current set of 
regulatory offenses may be based on a different rationale than 
the rationale responsible for traditional crimes, but it has the 
same focus on undesirable activity occurring within the 
territorial boundaries of a society. When the locus of both the 
perpetrator and the harm is within the territorial boundaries of 
a state, a regulatory offense can be predicated upon the 
structure and assumptions we have traditionally utilized for 
crime. It can incorporate the reactive model, which focuses on 
sanctioning the person who inflicted the harm at issue in a 
particular offense, and the basic dynamic—offender, harm, 
reaction, sanction—can apply. 
The criminal liability hypothesized above is intended to 
address a different scenario: undesirable state-sponsored 
activity that transcends the territorial boundaries of the society 
in which the harm occurs. Since the reactive model cannot deal 
effectively with this type of criminal activity, we must shift 
focus. If we cannot deter external actors from misappropriating 
our trade secrets, we must motivate the internal actors who 
control trade secrets to secure them and prevent their being 
misappropriated. The only way we can use criminal liability to 
this end is to reconceptualize the crime of economic espionage so 
that it has two components: (i) the conventional crime (economic 
espionage) which a state-sponsored agent commits against an 
owner of trade secrets, and (ii) the regulatory offense which the 
owner of trade secrets commits by not preventing the 
misappropriation of his/her/its proprietary information. 
Parsing economic espionage into these analytically-distinct 
components gives us an equitable way to use criminal liability to 
implement a focused paradigm shift that emphasizes 
prevention, not reaction, as the strategy we employ to protect 
trade secrets. We apply an attenuated level of criminal liability 
in the form of a regulatory offense to the person who is 
responsive to the reactive model, that is, the domestic owner of 
trade secrets. This attenuated liability is based on existing 
principles of criminal law. By not preventing the 
misappropriation of trade secrets, the owner of those secrets 
contributes to the commission of economic espionage. In a 
harsher mode, we hold those who contribute to the commission 
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of a crime liable as accomplices to that offense. 323 Here, we apply 
a much narrower principle: The owner is held liable not as an 
accomplice to the completed crime, but for the separate and 
distinct offense of failing to institute security measures 
sufficient to prevent the theft of trade secrets.324
C. Sum 
The strategy articulated immediately above may seem 
nothing more than a reiteration of the reactive model of law 
enforcement. Concededly, like that model, it encompasses a 
reaction to a crime—theft of trade secrets—and the consequent 
imposition of criminal liability. There is, however, a critical 
difference between the two. The current approach, as embodied 
in the EEA, is based on the assumptions that (i) law 
enforcement can react effectively to the compromise of trade 
secret information by agents of a foreign state, and (ii) a 
presumptively effective reaction will discourage such future 
attacks sufficiently to protect the security of trade secrets. 
Earlier Parts of this Article demonstrate that neither 
assumption is viable given that economic espionage is state-
sponsored crime and is increasingly transnational in character. 
The strategy articulated in subpart IV.B does not encompass 
either of these assumptions. It is based on a very different logic. 
It assumes that the best way to protect our trade secrets is to 
ensure that those who have possession and control of them take 
reasonable efforts to prevent their being compromised. Thus, its 
focus is on the owners of trade secrets (potential victims), not on 
those who seek to compromise trade secrets (potential 
criminals). It also assumes, for the reasons noted earlier, that a 
purely voluntary system of preventing the theft of trade secrets 
is likely to be ineffective, at least for the foreseeable future. This 
approach imposes criminal liability not in an attempt to deter 
the commission of crimes, but in an effort to create a climate in  
323. See, e.g., Brenner, Distributed Security: Moving Away from Reactive Law 
Enforcement, supra note 271, at 30–33. 
324. For the implementation of an analogous type of criminal liability, see id. at 
38–39. 
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which those who control trade secrets understand that they are 
the only ones who can prevent the compromise of that 
information. 
 
